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Abstract
Nativist theories have argued that language involves syntactic principles which are
unlearnable from the input children receive. A paradigm case of these innate principles is
the structure dependence of auxiliary inversion in complex polar questions (Chomsky, 1968,
1975, 1980). Computational approaches have focused on the properties of the input in
explaining how children acquire these questions. In contrast, we argue that messages are
structured in a way that supports structure dependence in syntax. We demonstrate this
approach within a connectionist model of sentence production (Chang, 2009) which learned
to generate a range of complex polar questions from a structured message without positive
exemplars in the input. The model also generated di￿erent types of error in development
that were similar in magnitude to those in children (e.g., auxiliary doubling, Crain &
Nakayama, 1987; Ambridge, Rowland, & Pine, 2008). Through model comparisons we trace
how meaning constraints and linguistic experience interact during the acquisition of
auxiliary inversion. Our results suggest that auxiliary inversion rules in English can be
acquired without innate syntactic principles, as long as it is assumed that speakers who ask
complex questions express messages that are structured into multiple propositions.
Keywords: Language acquisition, sentence production, subject-auxiliary inversion,
polar questions, conceptual structure, connectionist modeling
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Meaningful questions: The acquisition of auxiliary inversion in a
connectionist model of sentence production
1 Introduction
A central debate in language acquisition concerns the question which aspects of our
knowledge of language are learned from experience and which are part of our biological
endowment for language. Nativist theories have argued that there are syntactic principles
that are impossible to learn given the input that children receive (Chomsky, 1968, 1980). A
prominent example of such an unlearnable principle is the structure dependence of
linguistic operations which seems ubiquitous in language. It is most commonly illustrated in
terms of auxiliary inversion in English yes-no questions (also called polar questions). In
transformational grammars (Chomsky, 1981), polar questions are derived from declarative
sentences by auxiliary movement. For instance, declaratives with progressive verbs place
the auxiliary is before the verb jumping as in (1) and this auxiliary is moved to sentence
initial position in polar questions (2).
(1) The boy is jumping.
(2) Is the boy _ jumping?
Put this way, the auxiliary inversion rule is simple and should be learnable but it becomes
more challenging when there are multiple auxiliaries in complex declaratives like (3) with
two clauses.
(3) The boy that is jumping is happy.
When the polar question version of (3) is created as in (4), the main clause auxiliary is
moved to sentence initial position, rather than the embedded clause auxiliary as in (5).
(4) Is the boy that is jumping _ happy?
(5) *Is the boy that _ jumping is happy?
Chomsky (1980) argued that the syntactic knowledge that supports the correct structure (4)
is not obviously explained by the input to children. If children only hear single-clause
questions with one auxiliary (2) or right-branching questions with two auxiliaries like
(6) Is the boy _ chasing the cat that was lazy?
then the input would be consistent with an incorrect rule that creates ungrammatical
questions like (5) where the linearly ￿rst auxiliary is placed in sentence initial position.
In order to learn the correct rule, children would need to hear center-embedded polar
questions with two auxiliaries (4), but these questions appear to be rare in child-directed
speech. MacWhinney (2004) found only one occurrence in approximately 3 million
utterances (up to age 5;0) in the C￿￿￿￿￿￿ database (MacWhinney, 2000; see also Legate &
Yang, 2002). The absence of positive exemplars has been argued to demonstrate the poverty
of the stimulus with respect to auxiliary inversion in complex questions. On this view, the
input to children does not contain enough information to acquire the linguistic rules that
adult speakers appear to use (Chomsky, 1980; Crain, 1991; Laurence & Margolis, 2001;
Berwick, Pietroski, Yankama, & Chomsky, 2011). The poverty of the stimulus and the
compatibility of the input with an incorrect linear order rule have been taken as evidence in
support of innate syntactic knowledge. This argument has made auxiliary inversion in
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complex questions the prototypical defense of linguistic nativism and it is presented in
virtually all introductions to syntactic theory (e.g., Carnie, 2012; Radford, 2004) and ￿rst
language acquisition (e.g., Karmilo￿ & Karmilo￿-Smith, 2002; E. V. Clark, 2002; Ambridge &
Lieven, 2011).
An alternative to nativist accounts of auxiliary inversion are constructivist, or
usage-based, theories of language (Tomasello, 2003; Goldberg, 2006; Bybee, 2010). These
theories argue that the input from which children learn is richer than has been assumed by
nativists, and that children use powerful statistical learning mechanisms to gather
information from this data (Sa￿ran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Gómez, 2007). For example,
Reali & Christiansen (2005) have suggested that word co-occurrence statistics su￿ce to
render grammatical questions (4) more probable than their ungrammatical counterparts (5)
and Pullum & Scholz (2002) have argued that complex questions other than (4) can provide
evidence for the correct auxiliary inversion rule (see also Sampson, 1989). Thus, usage-based
theories have shifted the explanatory burden away from innate syntactic knowledge and
onto the learning mechanism and its input.
Although these approaches di￿er in where they seek relevant constraints on complex
question formation, they both locate these constraints within the domain of language.
English auxiliary inversion rules are either learned from linguistic input or preset by innate
syntactic constraints. In the present work, we propose an alternative account where
auxiliary inversion arises from constraints that are outside of language. In particular, we
focus on the role of the message that is conveyed when complex questions are being
produced. Our claim is that the message is structured into nonlinguistic propositions and
this structure constrains the way grammars can develop in the language system. Critically,
we argue that the message structure is available before children acquire the ability to
produce complex questions. We provide a computational model that is able to use the
structure of meaning when learning to produce grammatical complex polar questions from
impoverished input.
1.1 Framing the learning problem
Nativist and constructivist theories generally agree that some aspects of question
formation are learned from the input. This is because auxiliary inversion in interrogatives is
typologically rare and limited to a handful of predominantly West-Germanic languages
(Siemund, 2001). Most languages mark polar questions in other ways and therefore di￿erent
realizations of interrogative form must be acquired through experience. Speakers of English
learn to front auxiliaries in interrogatives and in nativist theories, learning is modulated by a
constraint on the grammar space that blocks the incorrect rule from being adopted (Crain &
Pietroski, 2001; Crain & Thornton, 2012). This constraint has been called structure
dependence because transformations are sensitive to the hierarchical phrase structure of
sentences. For example, sentence (3) would have a syntactic structure where each clause is
dominated by its own S node (matrix S1, embedded S2) as in (7).
(7) [The boy [that is jumping]S2 is happy.]S1
Structure dependence constrains the language system to consider only rules where
auxiliaries do not move out of their S domain, and this would guarantee the acquisition of
the correct rule where only the matrix auxiliary can be displaced. The constraint is
domain-speci￿c because it is formulated in terms of linguistic categories.
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Constructivist theories, on the other hand, have questioned whether an innate
syntactic constraint is required to learn auxiliary inversion (Pullum & Scholz, 2002; A. Clark
& Lappin, 2011; Ambridge, Pine, & Lieven, 2014) and the nature of errors that children make
throughout development has been an important source of evidence in this debate. In an
elicited production study, children between 3;2 and 4;7 never omitted the embedded clause
auxiliary as in (5), and this seemed to support the innateness of a structure-dependent
constraint (Crain & Nakayama, 1987). Using the same paradigm, however, Ambridge,
Rowland, & Pine (2008) found that such errors could be elicited when target items contained
modal auxiliaries or plural copulas, undermining the nativist line of reasoning. Moreover,
62% of the responses in Crain & Nakayama’s study contained other kinds of errors and older
children [6;3–7;9] tested in Ambridge et al. still produced 52.6% incorrect questions. This
suggests that the acquisition of complex questions is a slow, gradual process that requires
accumulation of relevant evidence over an extended period of time. A frequent error type in
both studies was auxiliary doubling where the main clause auxiliary was repeated after the
relative clause (e.g., Is the boy who is jumping is happy?) which is di￿cult to reconcile with
the idea that question formation involves auxiliary movement as a displaced constituent
should not persist in its canonical location. If questions are not derived from declaratives by
movement (Rowland & Pine, 2000; Dąbrowska & Lieven, 2005; Ambridge, Rowland,
Theakston, & Tomasello, 2006; Bouchard, 2012), there would be no need for a
structure-dependent constraint restricting auxiliary inversion. Others have argued that
these errors are due to performance limitations (Crain & Nakayama, 1987), but then a theory
is needed which explains why these limitations change over development.
Model space
Innate syntactic 
constraint
Initial state
Learning biases and
Linguistic experience
Structure Dependent
Grammars
Nativist Approach
Structure Dependent
Grammars
Constructivist Approach
Structure Independent
Grammars
Structure Independent
Grammars
Figure 1. Schematic of nativist and constructivist accounts of auxiliary inversion.
Nativist and constructivist approaches are often treated as polar opposites and it is
helpful to delineate their assumptions from a more abstract perspective. Language is a
neurobiological system whose con￿guration is determined by the values of its internal
parameters (e.g., the strength of ≥1014 synaptic connections). The set of realizable values is
the language network’s model space. Each point in the space implicitly represents the
grammar currently adopted by the learning child (Figure 1). During acquisition, input
interacts with learning biases and maturational constraints to force the system into a region
of model space which represents adult knowledge of language. Linguistic nativism assumes
that the learner never entertains grammars where structure dependence is violated because
an innate syntactic constraint removes such grammars from the model space (shaded region
in left panel of Figure 1). This constraint could be expressed in terms of the system’s initial
state, for instance the connectivity structure of the language-ready brain. Within this
approach, the role of experience is to learn the particular realization of structure dependence
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in a given language. On the constructivist view, structure-independent grammar regions
exist prior to experience and while the language system is in a state of immaturity, various
production errors are observed. Constructivists also assume that there are ‘acquisition
paths’ (Estigarribia, 2009) for structure dependence through the model space (dashed line in
right panel of Figure 1). Linguistic experience and domain-general learning biases ensure
that the language system eventually ends up in the correct region. These learning biases can
take many di￿erent forms (see Elman et al., 1996; Mitchell, 1997; Pearl & Lidz, 2009; Perfors,
Tenenbaum, & Regier, 2011) and it is likely that multiple biases are at work during language
acquisition. For example, a bias can be present in the way the language system attends to
and categorizes linguistic input, in the perceived similarity of input with knowledge already
acquired (A. Clark & Lappin, 2011), and in the dynamics of the learning mechanism itself
(Petersson & Hagoort, 2012). The key issue in this debate, then, is to elucidate the nature of
these biases and how they interact with experience of language.
1.2 Previous computational models of auxiliary inversion
To understand how input and biases might interact, it is useful to look at
computational models that have attempted to explain the acquisition of complex questions
without innate syntactic constraints on auxiliary movement. In this brief review, we make a
broad distinction between approaches that only use word sequences as input and those that
assume the input is coded in terms of some preordained set of syntactic categories. One
example of the word-based approach is the Simple Recurrent Network (SRN for short;
Elman, 1990) which is a layered neural network that predicts the next word in a sentence
based on previous words. It is able to acquire and represent syntactic knowledge in its
connection weights (Elman, 1991). Lewis & Elman (2001) showed that this model tended
towards structure-dependent processing in the absence of positive exemplars like (4), when
trained on an arti￿cial English-like language. At the critical position inside the relative
clause (e.g., Is the boy who is smoking crazy?) it activated the auxiliary is more strongly than
participles like smoking. This was taken as evidence that the correct generalization could be
based on substructure frequency because the bigram who is occurred in complex declaratives
within the training set, whereas the bigram who smoking did not, and SRNs have an
architectural bias to encode such local regularities (Elman et al., 1996; Rohde & Plaut, 1999).
Unfortunately, however, the model was only tested on a single complex question which
severely limits the generality of this approach. It has been noted, for example, that other
types of questions do not violate the co-occurrence statistics of English when the embedded
auxiliary is omitted (e.g., Can the boys who (can) run jump? ; Ambridge et al., 2008) and
therefore bigram statistics might not favor the grammatical form in all complex questions.
The idea of Lewis & Elman (2001) was explored more rigorously in the reduced model
of Reali & Christiansen (2005) which counted bigrams in a small corpus of child-directed
speech (10,705 sentences; Bernstein-Ratner, 1984). Bigram counts were then used to
compute sentence probabilities for 100 complex polar questions like (4) and their
ungrammatical version (5), and the grammatical form was preferred 96% of the time. Based
on these results, the authors argued that the input that children receive might provide
distributional information relevant to auxiliary inversion even if direct evidence (4) is
absent. These ￿ndings were subsequently scrutinized by Kam, Stoyneshka, Tornyova, Fodor,
& Sakas (2008) who only obtained 87% accuracy on a slightly di￿erent version of the corpus.
The items tested by Reali and Christiansen almost exclusively contained present tense,
subject-relative clauses with the singular embedded auxiliary is. When tested on questions
with object-relative clauses (e.g., Is the wagon that your sister is pushing red?) or those that
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required do-support (e.g., Does the boy who plays the drum want a cookie?), the model’s
accuracy dropped below chance. Subject-relativized questions were supported by the critical
bigram that/who is because English relative pronouns are homographs of other unrelated,
more frequent forms (e.g., that as a deictic pronoun in that is nice) and similar bigram
evidence did not exist for di￿erent question types. The model also failed to identify the
grammatical form in Dutch where polar questions can be formed by subject-verb inversion.
Thus, the bigram-based approach only worked for a narrow subclass of complex polar
questions, a wider range of other auxiliary inversion constructions was not supported by the
input. The occasional congruence between bigram statistics and grammaticality might
re￿ect an accidental fact of English rather than point towards a causal mechanism for the
acquisition of complex yes-no questions.
The model of Reali & Christiansen (2005) acted as a classi￿er based on sentence
probabilities and it has not been demonstrated that n-gram related biases for choosing
between whole sentence alternatives are su￿cient for language production or
comprehension. A model capable of generating utterances was the alignment learner of
A. Clark & Eyraud (2007). It had a bias to substitute word strings for one another if they had
been experienced in the same context within a text. For example, if the learner encountered
the boy is happy and the boy who is jumping is happy it could replace boy in a simple
question like is the boy tall? and thus generate the complex question is the boy who is
jumping tall? while avoiding the ungrammatical form *is the boy who jumping is tall?.
Clearly, this model could not generalize to novel questions for which supportive contexts
had not occurred in the input and it also overgenerated in undesirable ways because English
is not a substitution language (Berwick et al., 2011).
In contrast to the word-based approaches, a wide range of computational models
convert words in the input into syntactic categories and learn regularities over these
categories (Niyogi & Berwick, 1996; Sakas & Fodor, 2001; Yang, 2002; Hsu & Chater, 2010).
An example of this approach applied to auxiliary inversion is the data-oriented parsing
model of Bod (2009). It was trained on 10,280 adult utterances from the Eve corpus
(R. Brown, 1973) that were annotated for syntactic dependencies. By recombining treelets
extracted from the input it could parse novel sentences. In this framework, the probability of
the most probable derivation was used to measure grammaticality. For example,
grammatical complex questions had a probability of 4.4e-17 whereas ungrammatical ones
obtained a probability of 2.1e-18. These di￿erences are exceedingly small and it was not
tested if they held up for corpora other than Eve. Furthermore, in sentence generation only
40.5% of the generated questions fell under the syntactic pattern Is P who is Q R? and most of
these items were semantically unacceptable (e.g., Is that who is that some noodles?). Complex
questions with di￿erent relative clause types and variation in auxiliaries were not tested.
Despite the strong assumption of syntactically labelled input, the model did not reach a
human adult state.
Finally, a Bayesian learner was proposed to model grammar selection for a corpus of
child-directed speech (Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Regier, 2011). The corpus (Adam, R. Brown,
1973) was tagged with parts-of-speech and three grammars were handcrafted to parse the
resulting sequences of word categories. Due to a stipulated simplicity bias, the model
preferred a hierarchical grammar that could parse complex polar questions which had not
occurred in the training corpus. One concern with this approach is that it does not explain
how grammars are acquired in the ￿rst place. Another challenge is to explain children’s
errors. A grammar that generates errors would have to be included in the hypothesis space
and Bayesian inference would ￿rst have to select this de￿cient grammar before recovering
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to a grammar that approximates the adult knowledge of language. One would then have to
explain why the optimal grammar favored by the simplicity bias is not desirable for long
periods of development (up to 7 years of age).
Overall, the reviewed computational approaches have shown that probabilistic
language models can develop some preference for grammatical complex questions.
Word-based models have to assume that the appropriate input regularities for each
combination of structure, tense, aspect, and modality are available to children.
Category-based approaches assume that di￿erent auxiliaries are part of the same category
from the beginning of development and this assumption is at odds with many current
theories of language acquisition (e.g., Tomasello, 2003; O’Grady, 2005; Ambridge & Lieven,
2011). One reason why the auxiliary inversion debate has been di￿cult to resolve is that
there is very little agreement about the nature of the input. Each of the above models is
based on a di￿erent input corpus and there is no evidence that these corpora are truly
representative of the input that children receive to learn auxiliary inversion. Di￿erent adult
corpora display substantial variability in lexical and structural probabilities (Kilgarri￿, 2001;
Roland, Dick, & Elman, 2007) and these di￿erences are magni￿ed greatly when looking at
smaller corpora of child-directed speech, for children at di￿erent points in language
development (Chang, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2008). Moreover, if a large corpus was created
that provided learning data to a particular child for each combination of structure, tense,
aspect, and modality, we would still not be able to tell whether some children might learn
the abstract rule without some combinations in their input. A theory of language acquisition
should ensure that the correct constraints are being learned, even when there are gaps in the
input.
Although the reviewed models di￿er considerably in mechanistic terms, they all select
the most probable word, sentence or grammar based on statistical regularities in the input
using di￿erent biases. In sentence production, however, speakers do not merely generate the
most probable sequence of words but sentences that convey an intended meaning or
message, regardless of how (un)likely these sentences are vis-á-vis linguistic experience.
Hence, there is more to explain about auxiliary inversion than just statistical preferences.
Since production is the primary source of evidence with respect to the acquisition of
complex questions (Nakayama, 1987; Crain & Nakayama, 1987; Ambridge et al., 2008) it is
unclear how existing approaches relate to these data, in particular the patterns of error
observed in children over development. Even with large, representative input corpora, these
models would not explain how meaning is used to produce complex questions. A complete
account of auxiliary inversion needs to address production data in acquisition.
In our view, it is unlikely that the input conspires for each and every child to ensure
the correct generalizations are achieved across a range of relative clause types and
auxiliaries di￿ering in tense, number and modality. Our approach therefore argues that the
structure of meaning can help to smooth over gaps in the input allowing for broader
generalizations. By embedding auxiliary inversion within sentence production, we can
potentially explain a wider range of behaviors, including errors in development. In the
following section we will characterize the assumptions about message structure that are
needed to support the acquisition of complex questions in production.
1.3 Putting meaning into questions
Meaning has been argued to be important in grammatical development in both
usage-based (Tomasello, 2003; Goldberg, 2006) and generative approaches (Culicover &
Jackendo￿, 2005) but the role of meaning in the acquisition of complex polar questions has
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not been spelled out. Existing computational models (Lewis & Elman, 2001, Reali &
Christiansen, 2005; Bod, 2009; A. Clark & Eyraud, 2007) have focused on what can be
extracted from sentence form alone and meaning plays no role in these models. In contrast
to these approaches, we propose a computational model that learns to produce sentences
from meaning and we argue that the structure of meaning can bias the system towards
structure-dependent rules.
When producing a sentence, speakers convey a message and the message needs to
distinguish between The boy kisses the girl and The girl kisses the boy (Fodor & Pylyshyn,
1988; Levelt, 1989; Chang, 2002). As in many theories of meaning (Gruber, 1976; Jackendo￿,
1990), this distinction can be captured by thematic roles such as A￿￿￿￿ (the cause or
initiator of an action) and P￿￿￿￿￿￿ (the event participant that is a￿ected by the action). For
instance, the message for The girl eats the cake can be represented by thematic roles that are
bound to conceptual content as in A￿￿￿￿–GIRL, A￿￿￿￿￿–EAT, and P￿￿￿￿￿￿–CAKE which we
sometimes abbreviate as the proposition EAT(GIRL, CAKE). Language-speci￿c processing
strategies can then be used to link the thematic structure in the message to linear order in
sentence forms (Jackendo￿ & Wittenberg, 2014). For example, in English agents tend to
precede actions, and actions tend to precede patients. Although some theories view thematic
roles and propositions as linguistic elements, we assume that they are based in nonlinguistic
event/action representations (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). Monkeys and apes do not acquire
human-like languages and hence they should not have human-like semantic roles.
Nonetheless, they understand thematic relations of who does what to whom in social contexts
and situations that are relevant for survival (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Thus, conceptual
structure occurs in nonlinguistic animals, independent of language (Jackendo￿, 2014).
Furthermore, there is evidence that these abilities appear early in human development
where infants understand some aspects of events such as causality and goal-directedness
before they acquire language (Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Luo, 2011).
Declarative sentences assert a proposition whereas yes-no questions request
information about a proposition and this di￿erence in pragmatic function can be
represented in the message:
(8) The boy jumps. Meaning: JUMP(BOY)
(9) Does the boy jump? Meaning: JUMP(BOY) + YSNO
Augmenting the declarative message with a YSNO feature is a parsimonious way to
distinguish speech acts and it is motivated by the fact that sentence (8) would be an
appropriate answer to question (9). Hence, declarative and interrogative forms are
systematically linked by shared conceptual content in the underlying messages. The YSNO
feature itself does not prescribe auxiliary inversion and allows the surface form of polar
questions to di￿er across languages. For instance, in Japanese the message of (9) would be
expressed as the declarative (8) plus a question marker (e.g., declarative shonen ga jyanpu,
question shonen ga jyanpu ka?). Thus, a di￿erent mapping between meaning and form
would have to be learned for languages without auxiliary inversion.
In order to use tense and aspect correctly, adult speakers must know whether they are
referring to completed or ongoing events in the past or present. For example, sentence (10)
is the past progressive version of sentence (9), and we assume that features in the message
encode these distinctions (e.g., PAST, PROG).
(10) Was the boy jumping? Meaning: JUMP(BOY) + YSNO + PAST + PROG
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Tense and aspect interact with the speech act feature to constrain the production of verb
phrases in questions and declaratives.
Auxiliary inversion in complex questions can now be linked to these features.
Questions like (4) can be broken up into two clauses and each clause has its corresponding
nonlinguistic meaning:
(11) The boy is jumping Meaning: JUMP(BOY) + PROG
(12) Is the boy running? Meaning: RUN(BOY) + PROG + YSNO
Critically, it is necessary to distinguish which predicate is being questioned (the running
predicate is marked with a YSNO question feature), otherwise speakers would be unable to
distinguish Is the boy running? from Is the boy jumping?. The division of the message into
two propositions with one question marker is motivated by discourse constraints on
production. Speakers produce embedded clauses to identify referents when there are
multiple possible ones (Fox & Thompson, 1990; Diessel, 2004; Haywood, Pickering, &
Branigan, 2005). It is pragmatically felicitous to say the boy that was jumping if there is
another boy who was not jumping and both boys are salient in the mind of the speaker and
the listener (they are given and in the common ground; H. H. Clark, 1996). Since the
jumping boy is shared information between the speaker and the listener, there is no reason
for the speaker to ask whether the boy jumped. Information is typically requested about a
proposition that is private knowledge possessed by the listener, but not the speaker (Austin,
1962; Grice, 1975; Van Valin Jr. & LaPolla, 1997; Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus,
2008). If meaning was not structured into propositions, and instead encoded as a unordered
list (e.g., JUMP, RUN, BOY, BOY, YSNO, PROG, PROG), speakers could not know which boy they
are requesting information about. Therefore, adult production of complex polar questions
presupposes that there are two propositions where one is shared (11) and another is
questioned (12).
Although children may not always infer adult meaning from the start of language
acquisition, they must eventually infer enough to acquire the ability to use language in an
adult-like way and convey appropriate messages. In our approach, we assume that the
production of complex questions is preceded by the development of basic conceptual and
pragmatic distinctions. They include the ability to represent tense/aspect, di￿erent speech
acts, and multiple propositions. Data on the development of tense and aspect comes from
several studies. A basic understanding of tense semantics starts to develop around 2 years of
age (Weist, 1991; Wagner, 2001), 3 year-olds can reliably distinguish past, present and future
(Harner, 1981). Progressive aspect develops before past tense (R. Brown, 1973) and is initially
restricted to activity verbs (Shirai & Anderson, 1995). Although progressive forms increase
dramatically with age (Smith, 1980), 3 year olds can already use progressive verb
morphology productively (Akhtar & Tomasello, 1997). Thus, children mostly distinguish
between various tenses and aspects by around 3 years of age and it is reasonable to assume
that they activate PROG and PAST features to represent these di￿erences.
Questions are some of the most frequent elements in child-directed speech (Legate &
Yang, 2002; Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2003) comprising at least one third of
all utterances. Evidence for speech act identi￿cation in children comes from the
spontaneous production of yes-no questions, including non-canonical forms, which has
been found as early as 1;6 years of age (Dabrowska, 2000; Estigarribia, 2009). Around age 2;6
inverted yes-no questions begin to outnumber non-inverted ones in elicited production
(Erreich, 1984). In verb learning studies, children understand that questions request
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information and respond accordingly before the age of 3 (e.g., Brooks & Tomasello, 1999).
Hence we can assume that children distinguish between questions and declarative speech
acts (e.g., in terms of a YSNO feature) quite early in development.
Finally, the production of complex sentences with multiple clauses requires the ability
to represent di￿erent actions with separate thematic roles. Wynn (1996) provides evidence
that six month old infants can individuate events in multiple event sequences. Further
evidence that children can activate two propositions simultaneously comes from
theory-of-mind tasks where children have to maintain a reality proposition of where an
object is actually hidden and keep it distinct from a belief proposition about where one of
the characters thinks that the object is hidden. These abilities appear early in development
(Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) and become robust in verbal tasks by around 4 years
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Thus, before children
begin to spontaneously produce complex polar questions, they are developing the ability to
maintain two propositions in memory.
Based on these ￿ndings, we assume that messages are structured into multiple
propositions that can distinguish speech acts and tense/aspect before children extend
auxiliary inversion to complex structures. During acquisition, children learn to link this
pre-linguistic conceptual structure in the message to overheard utterances. In Table 1, we
outline how children would learn particular meaning-form mappings attested in the primary
linguistic data (structures (i)–(iv)) that can then be combined productively to generate novel
utterances (v). Simple declaratives (i) support the mapping of thematic roles into appropriate
Table 1
Meaning-based generalization
Utterance Type Meaning Example Sentence
(i) Simple declarative JUMP(BOY) + PROG The boy is jumping.
(ii) Simple yes-no question HAPPY(BOY) + YSNO Is the boy happy?
(iii) Complex declarative HAPPY(BOY) The boy that is jumping is happy.
JUMP(BOY) + PROG
(iv) Right-branching yes-no CHASE(BOY,CAT) + PROG + YSNO Is the boy chasing the cat that is lazy?
question LAZY(CAT)
(v) Center-embedded yes-no HAPPY(BOY) + YSNO Is the boy that is jumping happy?
question JUMP(BOY) + PROG
Note. Declaratives and questions are distinguished by a YSNO feature that encodes the type
of speech act. Two propositions in the sentence message enable the production of relative
clauses (individual propositions are shown on separate lines in the table). Novel complex
yes-no questions inherit semantic features from simple questions and complex declaratives.
Learned partial meaning-form mappings combine to generalize to novel constructions.
sentence positions (e.g., agentæ subject) and from exposure to simple questions (ii),
children can learn word order di￿erences between speech acts and place auxiliaries
sentence-initially in English polar interrogatives. Complex declaratives in the input (iii)
show that distinct propositions map to clausal units where the content of the main clause
proposition is disrupted by the center-embedded relative clause proposition in sequential
left-to-right production. When children encounter right-branching yes-no questions (iv),
they can link the speech act feature to the proposition expressed in the main clause which
then comes to signal the location of the questioned proposition in novel complex questions
(v). Although the primary linguistic data contains only few (if any) center-embedded yes-no
questions (MacWhinney, 2000; Legate & Yang, 2002), children might be able to combine
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knowledge from the frequent constructions (i)–(iv) to generate appropriate complex polar
questions (v) from the underlying messages (Goldberg, 2006). On the proposed account,
messages derive from nonlinguistic propositions which are the same across di￿erences in
tense, aspect, modality and speech act types. Thus, the meaning-form mappings learned
from utterance types (i)–(iv) in Table 1 are not dependent on subtle distributional
regularities in the input and generalize more widely, and this might explain why most
children eventually converge on the correct auxiliary inversion pattern in production.
In the present work, we investigate whether a computational model of syntactic
development can simulate this process of meaning-based generalization. We ￿rst describe
the model architecture, its learning environment and methods for training and evaluation
(section 2). We then show that the model generalizes in a structure-dependent way (section
3) and explain how this ability depends on the message structure (section 5). The approach
has broader coverage than previous computational accounts in that our model can produce
complex questions with copulas, di￿erent tensed and modal auxiliaries, do-support, and a
variety of relative clauses. In addition, we show that the model’s learning curves are
consistent with ￿ne-grained developmental di￿erences regarding auxiliary and relative
clause types, and relative clause length (section 3). In section 4, we replicate the quantity
and time-course of the distinct types of error children produced in behavioral studies. We
identify input structures that are necessary for children’s recovery from auxiliary doubling
errors in the course of development (section 6). Finally, we motivate assumptions about the
model’s input by means of a corpus of child-directed speech which is an order of magnitude
larger than the corpora that have been used in the computational approaches discussed
above. Our approach goes beyond previous work which did not include meaning and hence
could not model the production of complex questions and the errors observed in children.
2 A structured message account of auxiliary inversion
To instantiate a message-based account of auxiliary inversion, we used a connectionist
network called the Dual-path model that was designed to explain how people learn to
produce sentences from meaning (Chang, 2002). The model addresses important production
issues that are relevant for complex questions such as learning to activate thematic roles in
language-speci￿c ways and linking tense/aspect features to verbs. It was able to use
messages with multiple propositions to generate complex sentences with embedded clauses
(Chang, 2009; Fitz, 2009) and could account for relative clause development in English (Fitz,
Chang, & Christiansen, 2011). It has also been shown to learn abstract syntactic structures
(Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006), which is critical in explaining the breadth of generalizations in
complex question production. During syntactic development, the Dual-path model
generated errors that mirrored the errors that are produced by children in learning
verb-structure biases (Twomey, Chang, & Ambridge, 2014). Unlike some of the previous
models of auxiliary inversion, that only included English syntactic knowledge, it was able to
learn typologically-di￿erent languages like German (Chang, Baumann, Pappert, & Fitz,
2015) and Japanese (Chang, 2009), which suggests that it is a more general theory of
language acquisition. The present model version retains the basic design features of the
Dual-path architecture (Chang, 2002; Chang et al., 2006) and hence structure dependence in
complex questions will be argued to result from assumptions that were motivated to explain
these other production and acquisition phenomena.
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2.1 Dual-path architecture
The Dual-path model had two pathways, a sequencing pathway and a meaning
pathway (Figure 2). The sequencing pathway was an SRN (Elman, 1990) that learned
Event Semantics 
Context
Hidden
SEQUENCING SYSTEM
CCompress Compress
MEANING SYSTEM
Previous
Word
Produced
Word
run
chase
give
boy
dog
toy
kite
nice
lazy
-ss
-ed
-ing
is
was
did
do
can
could
he
she
it
that
CConcept–CRole
bindings
Role–Concept
bindings
CRole Copy AG
TH
RE
AG-TH
TH-RE
YSNO
PAST
PROG
AA
ACTION
AGENT
THEME
RECIPIENT
CHASE
GIRL
DOG
KITE
ACTION
AGENT
THEME
RECIPIENT
CHASE
GIRL
DOG
KITE
ACTION
AGENT
THEME
RECIPIENT
run
chase
give
boy
dog
toy
kite
nice
lazy
-ss
-ed
-ing
is
was
did
do
can
could
he
she
it
that
Figure 2. Architecture of the Dual-path model (Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006). Word input
arrived at the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer and activation spread through the sequencing and
meaning pathways to the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ output layer. The sequencing system
represented word categories at the CC￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ and C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ layers and learned abstract
syntactic frames over these categories. The meaning system represented a sentence-speci￿c
message that the model learned to activate incrementally at the right point in time. The two
pathways intersected at the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer and competed/cooperated at the output layer.
Solid arrows indicate connection weights that were adapted during learning, ￿xed copy
connections are represented by dashed arrows. Solid links between roles and concepts in the
respective layers were set during production and enabled binding. The conceptual structure
of the target utterance was represented by features in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer which
also signaled the intended speech act.
syntactic representations by predicting the next word in sentences, one word at a time. The
di￿erence between the model’s predictions and the actual next word (error) was used by the
learning algorithm (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) to adjust the weights in the
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network and this process gradually made future predictions more accurate. The sequencing
pathway mapped from the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer through a set of compression layers
(C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, CC￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) and a H￿￿￿￿￿ layer that eventually projected to the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
W￿￿￿ output layer. The compression layers only allowed a small number of lexical
distinctions to be represented and therefore the model had to learn syntactic categories
which were suitable for next word prediction. The H￿￿￿￿￿ layer received activation from a
C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer that held a copy of the previous H￿￿￿￿￿ layer activation state. This provided
the network with memory, allowing it to process temporally extended sequences of word
categories and learn abstract syntactic frames. By itself, the SRN biased the system towards
grammatical sequences, but it could not select a speci￿c sequence to convey a particular
message.
To generate a sentence for an intended message, the model had a meaning pathway
which encoded the target message in fast-changing links between a R￿￿￿ and a C￿￿￿￿￿￿
layer. There were four thematic role variables (A￿￿￿￿￿, A￿￿￿￿, T￿￿￿￿, R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) in the
R￿￿￿ layer which could be bound temporarily to conceptual content. For instance, the
message CHASE(DOG, KITE) for the dog is chasing the kite was instantiated as a ￿xed
connection between a R￿￿￿ layer unit for A￿￿￿￿ and a C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer unit for DOG (top
right of Figure 2). Likewise, there was a ￿xed connection between the T￿￿￿￿ unit in the
R￿￿￿ layer and the KITE unit in the C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer. These links were set by message
planning and were not changed by learning like the other links in the model. The C￿￿￿￿￿￿
layer was connected to the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ output layer, and this allowed the model to
learn which words were associated with which concepts. Since the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer in the
sequencing system was connected to the R￿￿￿ layer, the model could learn to incrementally
activate the R￿￿￿ layer units which then activated message-speci￿c concepts and
appropriate words at particular points in sentences. For example, at the beginning of the
above sentence, the model must decide whether to produce dog or kite and it learned that it
could activate the A￿￿￿￿ role unit to produce the correct word.
A reverse message in the CC￿￿￿￿￿￿ and CR￿￿￿ layers was set at the same time as the
production message and the CC￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer received input from the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer
(top left of Figure 2). This system allowed the model to determine the thematic role of the
previously produced word. The H￿￿￿￿￿ layer could then use this information to activate the
next role in the production message which was dependent on earlier choices. For example,
once the word dog had been produced this would activate the A￿￿￿￿ role in the CR￿￿￿ layer
on the subsequent time-step and signal to the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer that the A￿￿￿￿￿ role should be
activated next in order to produce a verb phrase. To enhance memory for the roles that had
already been produced, there was a CR￿￿￿ C￿￿￿ layer which held a running average of the
CR￿￿￿ layer activations.
The ￿nal part of the message was the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ which represented the
pre-linguistic conceptual structure of the target utterance (top middle of Figure 2). It had
features that encoded the number of arguments in the message. For example, active features
AG and TH in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ would signal that there were two event participants in
the transitive sentence the dog is chasing the kite, and hence there were arguments for the
A￿￿￿￿ and T￿￿￿￿ roles in the intended message. The E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ also encoded the
tense, aspect and speech act type of the target utterance. This information was provided to
the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer and guided the model to select appropriate structures in production.
Simple, present tense declaratives were treated as the default construction with no
additional active E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ features. Past tense and progressive aspect were marked
by features PAST and PROG relative to this default, and polar questions were signalled by the
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YSNO feature. When the YSNO feature was turned on, a question was the target utterance,
when it was switched o￿, a declarative had to be produced. These defaults were motivated
by the fact that present tense auxiliaries were more than three times as frequent in
child-directed speech than past tense auxiliaries (Thomas corpus; Lieven, Salomo, &
Tomasello, 2009). Similarly, Cameron-Faulkner et al. (2003) found declaratives to be more
frequent (39%, copular, subject-predicate and complex) than questions (32%, wh-questions
and polars), and there were 56% declaratives (44% questions) in the Nina corpus (Legate &
Yang, 2002). Defaults kept the number of features in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ small and
improved generalization.
Auxiliaries could occur in copular constructions (e.g., She is nice), progressive verb
forms (e.g., The boy runs) or in modal verb phrases (She can run). Copulas were the default
verb phrase type, an action feature AA and a MODAL feature distinguished target non-modal
and modal verb phrases in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, respectively. Any auxiliary could be
fronted in polar questions (e.g., Is she nice; Can she run?), other cases were expressed with
do-support (e.g., Does the dog chase the kite?). All distinctions made in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
are illustrated by the example message-sentence pairs shown in Tables 4 and 5 of the
Appendix.
2.2 Encoding complex utterances
In order to represent messages with two propositions, there were two sets of features
in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ and duplicate role units in the R￿￿￿ and CR￿￿￿ layers. For
example, the dative relative clause sentence The boy that the girl gives the book to jumped
was associated with the message A￿￿￿￿￿1–JUMP, T￿￿￿￿1–BOY, A￿￿￿￿￿2–GIVE,
A￿￿￿￿2–GIRL, T￿￿￿￿2–BOOK, R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2–BOY and the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ features TH1,
AG2, TH2, RE2, PAST1, TH1-RE2 (the roles in Figure 2 correspond to the roles marked as 1
here). The ￿rst proposition JUMP(BOY) + PAST was instantiated as a temporary connection
between the R￿￿￿ layer unit for T￿￿￿￿1 and the C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer unit for BOY. The second
proposition GIVE(GIRL, BOOK, BOY) involved links between the R￿￿￿ unit for A￿￿￿￿2 and
the C￿￿￿￿￿￿ unit for GIRL, the R￿￿￿ unit for T￿￿￿￿2 and the C￿￿￿￿￿￿ unit for BOOK, and
the R￿￿￿ unit for R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 and the C￿￿￿￿￿￿ unit for BOY. Thus, it was assumed that the
main idea that was being expressed was represented by the ￿rst proposition. The
co-reference feature TH1-RE2 helped to identify cases where the same referent occurred in
two di￿erent roles and there was such a feature for each combination of roles in the E￿￿￿￿
S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. Here, it signalled that the boy T￿￿￿￿1 of the ￿rst proposition was the same as
the boy R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 of the second proposition and this licensed the use of a relative clause.
Without this binding feature, we would assume that two di￿erent boys were being referred
to in each proposition. Since the same concept BOY was also linked to both the T￿￿￿￿1 and
R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 units in the C￿￿￿￿ layer, the model learned that it should initiate an embedded
clause by sequencing the word that after having produced the boy. When the segment the
boy that the girl gave the book to had been produced, the co-reference feature TH1-RE2
informed the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer that the R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 role had to be omitted from the relative
clause surface form. Activation that had accumulated in the C￿￿￿￿ and C￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿ layers
signalled that all of the roles in the target utterance had been produced except the main
clause verb. The model’s learned representations would cause the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer to activate
the A￿￿￿￿￿1 role to produce the verb jump next, whose simple past tense was encoded by
the active PAST1 and the silent PROG1 features. Like the R￿￿￿ units, tense and aspect
features were distinguished for each proposition. Messages for complex yes/no-questions
were encoded in the same way as those for complex declaratives, except for the single,
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additional speech act feature YSNO in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.
The sequencing and meaning pathways were cooperating (or competing) at the
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ output layer. Content words were activated by the meaning system,
auxiliaries and other function words were produced by the sequencing system. Since the
model was learning to use both pathways concurrently, errors could arise when these
systems acquired mismatching representations in early development. The sequencing
pathway was an SRN and hence it was similar to other statistical learning models in its
sensitivity to frequency and n-gram regularities in the input. The acquisition of di￿erent
constructions was therefore modulated by linguistic experience. However, the fast-changing
links in the message enabled variable-like behavior and endowed the model with the
syntactic productivity that SRNs lack (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Marcus, 2003; Chang, 2002).
Moreover, the message was not an unstructured bag of concepts (‘semantic soup’), but
instead was structured into propositions with thematic role slots and some aspects of
syntactic behavior which had to be learned from the input in other models can be explained
by properties of the message. For example, if the model learned how to use the YSNO and
PROG1 features to front auxiliaries in simple main clauses, then the same acquired
representations could support auxiliary inversion in complex polar questions because the
second proposition did not change this partial meaning-form mapping. In this respect the
Dual-path model di￿ered from some of the previously mentioned learners that could only
use surface sequences of words where there is ambiguity about whether the main or
embedded clause auxiliary should be placed in front.
2.3 Input distribution
With these provisions, the model was trained on a language containing copular (e.g.,
The boy was lazy), intransitive (e.g., The dog jumps), transitive (e.g., The cat is carrying the
toy), and dative structures (e.g., The boy gives the toy to the dog). Sentences with relative
clauses were assembled from these basic structures and all participant roles of the
underlying construction could be relativized. For instance, the matrix head noun could be
the agent, theme or recipient of a dative relative clause. The input grammar also generated
canonical questions with subject-auxiliary inversion, including questions with relative
clauses that could be attached to any lexical noun phrase. Verb tense (present, past) and
aspect (simple, progressive) were represented by in￿ectional morphemes that were treated
as separate words (e.g., push -ed, give -ing). Noun phrases were either lexical nouns preceded
by a determiner, or pronouns (he, she, it, him, her) which created positional variation in the
language. There were construction-speci￿c restrictions on animacy. For example, agents in
transitives were living things whereas themes in dative structures were inanimate objects
(see the Appendix for more details on the input language). The lexicon contained 78 words
in 12 categories which allowed the generation of approximately 5.7◊109 distinct utterances.
Across model subjects, 95.1% of all training items were single-clause structures, half of
them simple polar questions, and 4.9% of the input items contained a relative clause.
Right-branching and center-embedded relative clauses were approximately equally frequent
to ensure that both constructions were learned to an adult degree. 1.6% of the input items
were questions with a relative clause and 0.3% had a center-embedded relative clause. Both
assumptions were based on corpus data that will be discussed in more detail in section 6
below. Crucially, the learning environment did not contain complex questions with a
center-embedded relative clause and an auxiliary in both clauses as these are the structures
that were used to test the model’s ability to generalize. When auxiliaries occurred in two
clauses, these sentences were either assertions or questions with a right-branching relative
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clause (e.g., Could he touch the cup that was small?). With these properties, the input was
consistent with the assumptions made by Chomsky in formulating the problem of auxiliary
inversion, and with previous corpus evidence that children rarely, if ever, experience
questions of type (4) during acquisition. Thus, the model’s input should support the
incorrect structure-independent generalization where the linearly ￿rst auxiliary from the
embedded clause is placed in sentence-initial position.
2.4 Training and evaluation
In training, sentences were paired with messages that encoded their meaning.
Twenty-￿ve di￿erent sets of 50,000 message-sentence pairs were randomly created to train
25 model subjects for a total of 500,000 input patterns. Thus, the training set covered less
than 0.001% of the distinct sentences that the input grammar could potentially generate.
Before each target utterance, the sentence message was set in the meaning system and it did
not change during production. After exposure to each message-sentence pair the weights in
the network were updated. Model subjects were tested after every 20,000 training sentences
(which we call one epoch) on a set of novel items made up of simple declaratives, simple
polar questions, complex declaratives with a right-branching or center-embedded relative
clause, and their corresponding polar questions (50 items each). Center-embedded polar
questions in the test set contained auxiliaries in both clauses (copula, progressive aspect, or
modal) and this type of question had not occurred in the learning environment. Each model
subject was tested on 150 distinct questions of this type; items in the test set had a mean
utterance length (MLU) of 10.3 words (MLU 6.4 in training). Performance was evaluated in
terms of sentence accuracy where the model had to produce the target utterance exactly,
word-by-word. A production error occurred if the most active word in the model’s output
layer mismatched the target word in one or more sentence positions. Errors and their types
were automatically extracted from the model’s output using a syntactic coder script. No
errors of any kind were permitted for an utterance to be counted as correct. Thus, the
performance measure was maximally strict and not based on comparing word distributions
as in previous neural network studies of auxiliary inversion (e.g., Lewis & Elman, 2001; Reali
& Christiansen, 2005).
3 Meaning-based generalization to novel complex yes-no questions
When the model was trained and tested in the described way, it learned to produce the
target language with 99.3% accuracy after around half a million episodes. Figure 3 shows the
mean performance across subjects over time on the various structural types in the language
input (single-clause questions and assertions, multi-clause assertions, right-branching
questions), and on the novel center-embedded complex questions with an auxiliary in each
clause. Simple declaratives and questions were both learned by the ￿rst test point and this
mirrors studies where children showed similar accuracy for single-clause declaratives and
subject-auxiliary inversion questions over development (Santelmann, Berk, Austin,
Somashekar, & Lust, 2002). Single-clause structures were followed by constructions with a
relative clause. To examine the developmental patterns in these complex structures, a mixed
e￿ects model was applied to the percentage of correctly produced utterances for each model
subject, with speech act (declarative, question) and sentence type (right-branching,
center-embedded) crossed. Unless stated otherwise, linear mixed models reported
throughout the paper used logit-transformed percentages or proportions (Jaeger, 2008).
Model subject was a random intercept with speech act and sentence type as random
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Figure 3. Model performance for all structural types in the input language, which were either
single-clause, right-branching or center-embedded questions and declaratives.
Center-embedded questions were novel polar questions with two auxiliaries which were not
present in the model’s learning environment.
main-e￿ect slopes (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), p-values were obtained by model
comparisons (likelihood-ratio tests). There was no di￿erence between right-branching
declaratives and questions and this is consistent with the lack of di￿erences in children’s
elicited production of these structures (Diessel & Tomasello, 2005). Center-embedded
structures were learned more slowly by the model than right-branching structures (— =
≠0.32, SE = 0.05, ‰2(1) = 70.5, p < 0.001) and children also ￿nd center-embedding more
di￿cult than right-branching, both in comprehension (Clancy, Lee, & Zoh, 1986; Côrrea,
1995; Kidd & Bavin, 2002) and production (Diessel & Tomasello, 2000). Finally, there was an
interaction of speech act and sentence type due to the slower acquisition of center-embedded
questions with two auxiliaries, and there is evidence that these structures are di￿cult even
for older children (52.6% errors in children aged 6.3–7;9; Ambridge et al., 2008).
The ability to produce complex questions is preceded by the acquisition of relative
clauses in complex declaratives. Several studies found that English speaking children have
more di￿culty comprehending and producing transitive object-relative clauses (P-relatives
such as The boy that the cat chases...) than transitive subject-relative clauses (A-relatives such
as The boy that chases the cat...) (see O’Grady (1997) and Diessel (2004) for overviews),
although processing di￿culty in P-relatives is modulated by many factors, e.g., head noun
animacy and the presence of pronoun subjects (Kidd, Brandt, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2007;
Reali & Christiansen, 2007). Moreover, children ￿nd intransitive subject-relative clauses
(S-relatives such as The boy that runs...) easier than A-relatives, and indirect object-relative
clauses (IO-relatives such as The cat that the boy gave the toy to...) harder than P-relatives
(Diessel & Tomasello, 2005). The model’s language input contained all these relative clause
types and they occurred with equal frequency in the learning environment. A mixed e￿ects
model was applied to the percentage of correctly produced complex declaratives with
relative clause type (S, A, P, and IO) as a ￿xed factor which was coded numerically, centered
around 0. Model subject was a random intercept with by-subject slopes for relative clause
type. There was a signi￿cant main e￿ect (— = 0.34, SE = 0.04, ‰2(1) = 39.1, p < 0.001),
indicating that the development of relative clause structures in the model corresponded to
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the order of acquisition in the human data (S > A > P > IO, where X > Y means that X was
acquired before Y). Similar results with the Dual-path model were previously obtained in
Fitz, Chang, & Christiansen (2011) where these ￿ne-grained developmental di￿erences were
explained in terms of substructure regularities. For example, the subsequences THAT AUX
and THAT VERB were shared across several of the input structures (e.g., copular relative
clauses, S-relatives and A-relatives) and A-relatives were aided by exposure to similar
constructions (see also Abbot-Smith & Behrens, 2006) because the SRN component of the
Dual-path model was sensitive to distributional patterns of word categories. Subsequences
like THAT DET NOUN and THAT PRONOUN were less common in the input and hence
P-relatives were more di￿cult to learn than A-relatives despite occurring with the same
construction-level frequency in the learning environment. Taken together, these results on
the production of complex declaratives suggest that the Dual-path model can capture some
aspects of relative clause acquisition in children.
Last to develop were the novel center-embedded yes-no questions that were absent in
training. Even though the learning environment was consistent with a
structure-independent rule where the linearly ￿rst auxiliary is displaced, the model
eventually generalized to the correct rule with high production accuracy (mean 98.1% at the
end of training, SD = 2.6%). Nearly half of the model subjects achieved perfect
generalization (100% accuracy) and each of the 25 model subjects reached at least 90%
accuracy. Remaining errors occurred almost exclusively in the post-relative clause region
(99% of all errors), indicating sources of production di￿culty which were unrelated to
structure-dependent generalization. Tested questions could have copular, intransitive,
transitive or dative relative clauses, which could relativize subjects, direct objects or indirect
objects (Table 2). Auxiliaries could function as a copula, modal auxiliary, or as an auxiliary
Table 2
Examples of correctly produced complex questions
Example question Modality Auxiliary Relative
clause
Gap Tense
Was the brother that is lazy touching it? Non-modal Di￿erent Copular Subject Mixed
Could the boy that could carry the apple run? Modal Same Transitive Subject Past
Can the girl that was sitting jump? Mixed Di￿erent Intransitive Subject Mixed
Is the mother that the aunt is holding waiting? Non-modal Same Transitive Object Present
Can the man that could throw it to him eat the toy? Modal Di￿erent Dative Subject Mixed
Is the pencil that she can show to the boy nice? Mixed Di￿erent Dative Object Present
Note. Novel center-embedded questions with two auxiliaries that were produced correctly at
the end of training include a wide variety of structures with di￿erences in tense, modality,
and relative clause type.
in a progressive aspect verb phrase, and di￿erent auxiliaries could occur across clauses. Verb
tense could be present or past and aspect could be simple (copulas, modal auxiliaries) or
progressive. Hence, there was far more diversity in the tested items than in previous
computational studies of auxiliary inversion (Lewis & Elman, 2001; Reali & Christiansen,
2005; A. Clark & Eyraud, 2007; Bod, 2009; Perfors et al., 2011) and the fact that the Dual-path
model could produce all of these question types correctly demonstrates the robustness of
meaning-based generalization.
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3.1 Auxiliary type
Behavioral studies have found that the acquisition of complex questions with di￿erent
auxiliaries varies over development. Children aged 3;2–5;11 in Crain & Nakayama (1987)
produced 59% correct questions with either copulas or progressive verb forms in each clause,
whereas children from the same age group only produced 21% correct questions with a
modal auxiliary in one of the two clauses. In another study, Ambridge et al. (2008) found
that children aged 6.3–7;9 produced 47.4% correct questions with modal auxiliaries in both
clauses. Since these children were older than the ones in Crain & Nakayama (1987) and yet
produced more errors, these results suggest that modal complex questions were more
di￿cult to learn than copular or progressive forms.
To test for these di￿erences in the model, we split the production data by auxiliary
type. Modal questions had modal auxiliaries in both clauses, non-modal questions had a
copula or progressive auxiliary in both clauses, and mixed-modal questions had a modal
auxiliary in one of the clauses and a copula or progressive auxiliary in the other. Figure 4
(left panel) depicts the intermediate performance on these three types of questions for
epochs 5–7 (one epoch corresponds to 20,000 training items). For statistical analysis all data
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Figure 4. Cross-section of production accuracy on complex questions distinguished by
auxiliary type in the main and embedded clause (modal, non-modal, mixed-modal), relative
clause type (subject, object gap), and relative clause length (short, medium, long).
from epochs 2–21 was used, where model performance was neither zero, nor at ceiling (see
Figure 3). A mixed model with auxiliary type (non-modal, mixed-modal, modal) as ￿xed
factor and random intercepts for subjects, with auxiliary type as random main-e￿ect slopes,
revealed a main e￿ect for auxiliary type (‰2(2) = 30.2, p < 0.001). Orthogonal contrasts
showed that questions with non-modal auxiliaries were learned earlier than the other two
question types (— = 0.88, SE = 0.16, ‰2(1) = 23.6, p < 0.001) and questions with mixed
auxiliaries developed before questions with exclusively modal ones (— = 0.36, SE = 0.14 ,
‰2(1) = 6.6, p < 0.05). Thus, the model reproduced the order of acquisition for complex
questions with di￿erent auxiliaries from the developmental literature (Crain & Nakayama,
1987; Ambridge et al., 2008). The bias for non-modal auxiliaries was due to the occurrence of
auxiliary forms like is/was in a range of di￿erent constructions (e.g., as copulas and
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progressives). Since the rules for question formation were the same across these
constructions, non-modal auxiliaries were being trained more than modal ones in
interrogative speech acts, leading to earlier acquisition and better performance. This
account is supported by the observation that the non-modal auxiliaries occurring in the
model’s input language were nearly twice as frequent in the Thomas corpus (Lieven et al.,
2009) than the modal ones.
3.2 Relative clause type
A second study by Nakayama (1987) investigated 3–5 year old children’s elicited
production of center-embedded questions with di￿erent relative clause types and found that
they performed better for items with a subject-relative clause than items with an
object-relative clause (66% versus 44% correct). To test whether the model showed similar
behavior, a mixed model was ￿tted to the percentage of correctly produced center-embedded
polar questions, with relative clause type as ￿xed factor. Model subject was a random
intercept with by-subject slopes for relative clause type. There was a main e￿ect for type (—
= 0.37, SE = 0.13, ‰2(1) = 7.7, p < 0.01), indicating that complex questions with
subject-relative clauses were learned before questions that contained an object-relative
clause, and this is in line with the behavioral results in children (Nakayama, 1987). The
explanation for this e￿ect was similar to the account for the A/P-relative clause di￿erence in
complex declaratives, in that word category subsequences in subject-relatives (e.g., THAT
AUX) were overall more common in the learning environment than subsequences
supporting object-relatives (e.g., THAT DET) and the Dual-path model’s sequencing system
was sensitive to these substructure frequencies during syntactic development.
3.3 Relative clause length
Nakayama (1987) also found that children had more di￿culty with complex questions
containing long relative clauses than with short ones. We split center-embedded questions
in the model’s test set into three groups, those with a short relative clause (copular +
intransitive), those with a medium-length relative clause (transitives) and those with a long
relative clause (datives). As in Nakayama’s study, we only included subject-relative clauses
in the comparison. A mixed model was applied to the percentage of correct productions
with relative clause length as ￿xed factor, a random intercept for subjects, and by-subject
random slopes for relative clause length. There was a main e￿ect of length (‰2(2) = 8.6, p <
0.05), suggesting that longer relative clauses reduced production accuracy in complex
questions. Orthogonal contrasts revealed that short relative clauses were learned better than
the longer ones (— = 0.38, SE = 0.16, ‰2(1) = 3.9, p < 0.05) and medium-length relative
clauses were acquired before long ones (— = 0.36, SE = 0.17, ‰2(1) = 4.7, p < 0.05). These
results are consistent with the developmental data of Nakayama (1987) and the model
showed this behavior because of substructure similarity across the di￿erent sentence types.
Short subject-relative clauses like the boy that is sleeping... shared abstract substructures
(THAT AUX VERB) with longer ones in transitive and dative structures. Thus, learning to
produce the longer relative clauses helped the model to also produce the subsequences in
the shorter subject-relatives, which contributed to this length e￿ect.
To summarize these ￿ndings, the model generalized auxiliary inversion in a
structure-dependent way with 98% accuracy, despite the fact that center-embedded
questions with multiple auxiliaries had not occurred in the learning environment. It
correctly produced a diverse set of tested questions (Table 2), with di￿erences in tense,
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modality and relative clause type, including object-relatives containing distinct auxiliaries
across clauses. High accuracy and broad coverage demonstrate that generalization based on
message structure is a powerful mechanism for language acquisition. Developmental
di￿erences in acquisition were found to be consistent with what is currently known about
the production of complex questions in children with respect to di￿erent auxiliaries, relative
clause structure, and length. Input distributional patterns such as auxiliary frequency and
local substructure regularities modulated learning and processing but these factors were
distinct from the causal mechanism that enabled generalization in our account of auxiliary
inversion. From input structures that are widely available to children the model learned how
the structure of thought is connected to language-speci￿c forms, and these meaning-form
mappings extended to complex questions when novel messages were expressed.
4 Errors in development
Having modeled di￿erential learning and the adult state, we now turn to examining
more speci￿c production errors observed in development. Errors and their distribution at
di￿erent stages o￿er a direct window into the intermediate representations that children
develop, providing clues towards a characterization of the acquired linguistic knowledge and
the underlying learning mechanism. Two elicited production studies have recorded errors in
the development of complex polar questions (Crain & Nakayama, 1987; Ambridge, Rowland,
& Pine, 2008). These studies used a similar method in that an experimenter requested
children to pose a question to a puppet (“Ask the puppet if X”, where X contained a relative
clause, e.g., “...the boy that is watching TV is happy” ). Crain and Nakayama tested children
around 4;7 years of age and found no production errors that violated structure dependence
where the embedded clause auxiliary instead of the main clause auxiliary was placed in
sentence-initial position (e.g., *Was the boy who _ holding the plate is crying?). They argued
that this provided support for the view that children are endowed with an innate
structure-dependent constraint that rules out these errors. Ambridge et al. (2008), however,
questioned the design of this study. They argued that structure-dependent errors were
unlikely to be observed with the materials used by Crain and Nakayama because auxiliary
extraction from the embedded clause would create bigrams that strongly violate the
co-occurrence statistics in English (e.g., who holding in the above example). In their
replication of the study, they instead used complex questions with modal auxiliaries where
structure-dependent errors would engender legal bigrams (e.g., *Can the boy who run fast can
jump high?). They found that children in the age range 4;7–5;7 (mean 5;1) produced around
5% of such errors in modal questions, and children between 6.3–7;9 years of age (mean 6;9)
also committed around 5% of these errors in questions with singular/plural copulas and
progressive forms (e.g., *Is the lion that eating the man is hungry?). These errors resembled
violations of structure dependence in that the relative clause auxiliary was missing.
However, due to the use of identical auxiliaries across clauses in their items, it is not possible
to tell whether the initial auxiliary was a copy of the main clause auxiliary, or a displaced
embedded clause auxiliary. We therefore label these errors descriptively as embedded
auxiliary errors. Taken together, these studies have shown that children are unlikely to
make errors related to the relative clause auxiliary, suggesting that some constraint
in￿uences complex question formation, but this constraint does not seem to be absolute.
A more common error type in both studies was auxiliary doubling (34% of all errors
across the four experiments) where the embedded clause auxiliary was present and the main
clause auxiliary was repeated in its canonical post-relative clause position (e.g., *Is the boy
who is watching Mickey Mouse is happy?). Crain & Nakayama (1987) explained these errors
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as a result of memory de￿ciencies; children copy an auxiliary into sentence-initial position
and forget to delete it later. Hence, they view this type of error as being caused in
performance, outside the core operation of a structure-dependent constraint. Ambridge et al.
(2008), on the other hand, argued for a statistical learning account of auxiliary inversion
where the main clause auxiliary is reactivated when it forms a high-frequency word
category chunk with relative clause-￿nal words (e.g., NOUN AUX in the example above).
Both are prima facie plausible accounts of why auxiliary doubling might occur, but they beg
the question of how production de￿cits and local attraction are overcome when children
retreat from these errors over time. Moreover, these accounts do not explain how children
eventually come to know that the main clause auxiliary should be deleted.
Complex questions developed gradually in the Dual-path model and we wanted to
determine if errors produced along the way were comparable in kind and magnitude to the
error patterns found in children. Replicating errors provides strong, additional constraints
for computational approaches, and a complete account of auxiliary inversion should align
with these patterns. To this end, model output was coded as an embedded auxiliary error if
the utterance started with an auxiliary, had a relative pronoun and the embedded verb in the
target positions, but the embedded verb phrase auxiliary was omitted (e.g., Is [...] that _
running [...]). If the embedded clause auxiliary was present and, in addition, the initial
auxiliary was repeated in the main clause verb position, an auxiliary doubling error had
occurred (e.g., Is [...] that is running is [...]). Finally, we tested whether the model committed
genuine structure-dependent errors in mixed-modal items similar to the ones used in Crain
and Nakayama’s (1987) Experiment 2. These errors were coded like embedded auxiliary
errors with the additional requirement that the sentence-initial auxiliary in the model’s
output had to be the embedded clause auxiliary from the target question, not the main
clause auxiliary. This distinction was possible because the mixed-modal items by design
contained di￿erent auxiliaries in each clause. The three error types are exempli￿ed in Table
3. As before, a correct polar question was produced when the utterance matched the target
Table 3
Example error types
Declarative Question Error type
The boy who is holding the plate is
crying.
Is the boy who? holding the
plate is crying?
Embedded auxiliary
The boy who is jumping was happy. Was the boy who is jumping
was happy?
Auxiliary doubling
The boy who can run is jumping. Can the boy who? run is
jumping?
Structure dependence
Note. Bold face and null constituents mark the error location.
question word-by-word. In order to compare errors produced by the model against the child
production data, we used the weighted average (by number of subjects) from the two
experiments in age range 3;2–5;11 (Crain & Nakayama, 1987) and the data in the age groups
4;7–5;7 and 6.3–7;9 from Ambridge et al. (2008) since these groups represented three
di￿erent mean ages. For comparison, the human ages were mapped onto model epochs that
matched the overall pattern across the three studies. Figure 5 shows that the model
generated the error patterns that were found in the experimental studies when production
accuracy was comparable between the model and children. Embedded auxiliary errors were
frequent in the model initially, but quickly diminished over development. Auxiliary doubling
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Figure 5. Error comparison between the model and child production data from three age
groups over development. CN denotes the weighted average of Experiments 1 and 2 in Crain
& Nakayama (1987), ARP1 and ARP2 refer to Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, in Ambridge
et al. (2008).
errors followed an inversely U-shaped curve, starting o￿ low, but rising to approximately
20% by epoch 2, and this level was maintained until epoch 5 where they began to decline
towards 0.4% at the end of learning. Furthermore, the model produced no genuine
structure-dependent errors in the age range that matched the age of children in the study of
Crain and Nakayama (epochs 3–4). In other words, the embedded clause auxiliary was never
placed sentence-initially which is consistent with the available child production data. Thus,
the very same model that reached adult production accuracy (Figure 3) and reproduced
developmental di￿erences in complex questions (Figure 4), also replicated the types and
magnitudes of errors found in children—the absence of structure-dependent errors in
mixed-modal items (Crain & Nakayama, 1987), the moderate occurrence of embedded
auxiliary errors (Ambridge et al., 2008), and the large number of auxiliary doubling errors
found in both these studies. This con￿uence suggests that the Dual-path model captures
critical properties of the mechanism underlying the acquisition of complex questions in
children.
To understand the nature of these errors and why the model was able to replicate
them it is useful to reassess the process of auxiliary inversion. In generative accounts, an
auxiliary is moved or copied into sentence-initial position and this right-to-left operation
creates a choice in questions with multiple auxiliaries. The prominence of auxiliary doubling
errors across studies, however, is incompatible with movement and the embedded auxiliary
errors observed in Ambridge et al. (2008) argue against a copy account. Complex question
production, in humans and our model, is an incremental left-to-right process that starts with
a conceptualization of the intended message, and the communicative intention to elicit
information precedes formulation. The ￿rst production step is to generate an auxiliary
which belongs to the questioned proposition. Input evidence for this association is
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unequivocal since it holds in all single-clause and complex questions in the learning
environment. Thus, children can learn from abundant experience that question production
starts with an auxiliary that is part of the questioned proposition and adopt this default
when producing other simple and complex questions. Put the other way round, input
evidence to initiate a question with an auxiliary other than the one linked to the questioned
proposition is completely absent. From this perspective, it is no longer puzzling how
children can come to know which auxiliary has to be placed in front. The sentence-initial
auxiliary always belongs to the questioned proposition and therefore does not mark a choice
point between main and embedded clause auxiliary. As a consequence, errors where the
auxiliary from an unquestioned proposition initiates production are not to be expected, and
this explains the absence of structure-dependent errors in child production data (Crain &
Nakayama, 1987; Ambridge et al., 2008).
When the relative clause with a modal auxiliary or progressive verb is being produced,
the ￿rst genuine choice point is reached which is a potential source of error. The production
system needs to link the initial auxiliary to some verb phrase and the embedded verb is the
￿rst option. This link is supported by all simple questions in the input, and when main and
embedded auxiliaries are identical (as in the materials of Ambridge et al. (2008)) embedded
auxiliary errors can occur. At the same time, complex declaratives provide strong input
evidence against omitting the relative clause auxiliary and this might explain why these
errors were infrequent, in particular within the elicited production paradigm where children
could simply repeat the target relative clause from the experimenter’s instructions.
The second choice point occurs at the transition back into the main clause where the
auxiliary needs to be suppressed. Here, again, complex declaratives provide strong evidence
for retaining the auxiliary and local attraction might also support this choice (Ambridge et
al., 2008). Therefore, a large number of auxiliary doubling errors should be expected and this
is in line with the experimental evidence. Thus, incremental left-to-right production in the
model predicts the pattern of errors observed in children’s elicited production. Error types
and their distribution over development in turn suggest that complex question formation is
the product of several, independent processing steps that have to be acquired separately (see
also Mayer, Erreich, & Valian, 1978; Rowland, 2007):
(1) F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ Start with auxiliary from questioned proposition.
(2) E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ Produce relative clause with full verb phrase.
(3) S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ Omit auxiliary in main clause canonical position.
If children apply F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, structure-dependent errors are ruled out. They are ruled out
not by a hard-wired constraint on a movement operation, but by knowledge acquired from
copious input evidence that initial auxiliaries in polar questions group with the questioned
proposition. If children apply F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ but fail to apply E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, this results in
the embedded auxiliary errors observed in Ambridge et al. (2008). If they apply F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿
and E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ but fail to apply the S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ step, a complex polar question with
an auxiliary doubling error will be produced. When the learning task is re-conceptualized in
terms of incremental left-to-right production, rather than right-to-left auxiliary fronting,
errors are naturally expected to occur at sentence-internal choice points while
representations for language are still developing, and this is consistent with the
experimental data.
To reach an adult state, the Dual-path model needed to acquire these three
components—F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ and S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿—which involved both
pathways. For instance, speech act distinctions were represented in the meaning system,
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whereas the frequency of di￿erent word sequences was encoded in the sequencing system,
and both pathways contributed to production at the output layer. Furthermore, the
F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ and S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ components could depend on message
structure and input evidence in di￿erent ways and were therefore learned at di￿erent rates.
When combinations of these components were still to be learned, the di￿erent error types
were produced. Thus, the model provides a uni￿ed account of the acquisition of the correct
rule as well as the generation of errors at di￿erent points in development. Rather than
attributing these errors to de￿cits extraneous to language, like memory limitations, the
model explains errors as a result of the same learning mechanism that allowed it to acquire
the language in the ￿rst place.
In the remainder of this paper we will investigate what the precise role of the message
and the in￿uence of linguistic input was in learning the F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ and
S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ steps of complex question production. In section 5, we contrast di￿erent
model versions where features in the message were manipulated to trace their contribution
to the F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ and E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ components. In section 6, we identify input
structures required to learn the S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ step and validate model-based discoveries by
a corpus analysis. These comparisons will shed light on how the model could gradually
recover from the error types associated with these three production steps, until an adult
performance level was achieved.
5 Role of the message
The unique character of the approach taken here is that question formation is modeled
under the assumption that language is used to convey meaning. Syntactic rules develop in
the process of learning to link sentence meaning to sentence forms in the input and the
message is made up of di￿erent propositions that support the acquisition of
structure-sensitive rules. Incremental left-to-right production creates choice points in
complex questions that could be inferred from the observed error patterns in children’s
elicited production. The model had to learn how these choice points were associated with
di￿erent parts of the message.
5.1 Speech act encoding
The ￿rst step was to produce the auxiliary belonging to the questioned proposition at
the start of the sentence (F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿). The target auxiliary type (copula, modal, or
progressive) was determined by a combination of tense, aspect and action features in the
E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. For instance, the combination of PROG + AA features mapped to is +
verb, the MODAL feature mapped to can + verb, and the silence of all features (PROG, AA, and
MODAL) mapped to the copula is + adjective. The E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ also distinguished
speech acts in terms of a YSNO feature which signalled for both simple and complex
messages that a question instead of a (default) declarative sentence had to be produced.
Single-clause sentences were represented by a message with one proposition. For example,
the sentence The boy is jumping was encoded by the message A￿￿￿￿￿1–JUMP, T￿￿￿￿1–BOY
and E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ features PROG1, AA1, TH1. When the YSNO feature was present, the
target utterance changed to Is the boy jumping?. Through experience of these simple
questions in the learning environment, the model could learn to associate the YSNO feature
with the roles coded as A￿￿￿￿￿1 and T￿￿￿￿1, and the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ features indexed
by 1. This association linked the YSNO feature with the questioned proposition and the link
was gradually strengthened by every single-clause question in the language input. Complex
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questions, on the other hand, were supported by a message with two propositions. For
example, Is the boy that was jumping running? was represented by the A￿￿￿￿￿1–RUN,
T￿￿￿￿1–BOY, A￿￿￿￿￿2–JUMP, T￿￿￿￿2–BOY and E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ features PROG1, AA1,
TH1, PROG2, PAST2, AA2, TH2, TH1-TH2, together with the neutral YSNO feature. Due to the
learned association between the speech act marker YSNO and the proposition indexed by 1,
over development the message came to encode knowledge of which of the two propositions
was questioned. Since the questioned proposition was always represented in the same
spatial location of the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, this knowledge transferred to multi-clause
questions. Thus, the model could activate the correct auxiliary is from the questioned
proposition (rather than was) in the F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ production step. With this knowledge in
place, no errors occurred where a question was initiated with an auxiliary from the
proposition expressed in the embedded clause and the absence of these errors is consistent
with the existing child production studies on complex questions (Nakayama, 1987; Crain &
Nakayama, 1987; Ambridge, Rowland, & Pine, 2008).
To demonstrate that the YSNO feature itself carried no clause-speci￿c information, the
model was compared to a version where questions were the default speech act and
declaratives were marked instead by a feature DECL in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. Representing
questions by the absence of a feature entails that there was no overt marker in the message
that signalled the questioned proposition. The model had to learn from experience which
proposition the sentence-initial auxiliary was linked to. All other parameters were kept
constant and the model was trained and tested as before. Results from this comparison
indicated that the two model versions performed identical in every relevant aspect. At the
end of training, accuracy on novel complex questions with two auxiliaries reached 99.1%
compared to 98.9% for the model with declaratives as default structures (see Figure 3). Thus,
the representation of questions by means of an active YSNO feature was not necessary for
structure-dependent generalization. The model version with an interrogative default also
produced similar auxiliary doubling patterns (ranging between 25.3% initially and 0.1% at
the end of training) and matched children’s errors in development equally well. This model
comparison shows that the speci￿cs of semantically encoding the speech act distinction
were negligible. What was crucial for learning the F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ step was that di￿erent
propositions were systematically distinguished in the conceptual structure of the message
such that interrogative forms could reliably be linked to the questioned proposition through
linguistic experience.
5.2 Reduced in￿uence of the message
After the initial auxiliary has been produced in the F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ step, it needs to be
linked to one of two non-adjacent verbs. In the critical complex questions, the embedded
clause verb is the linearly ￿rst, but incorrect, option. To generalize in a structure-dependent
way, the model had to retain the embedded clause auxiliary and produce a full verb phrase
inside the relative clause. Thus, the second component in complex question formation was
to produce the embedded clause auxiliary (E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿). Surface distributional evidence
for the auxiliary-verb link was con￿icting. In simple yes-no questions, the sentence-initial
auxiliary and its corresponding verb form were separated by the subject noun phrase (Is the
boy jumping?), in complex declaratives (The boy that is jumping is running) the ￿rst verb was
always immediately preceded by its auxiliary. Since simple questions were substantially
more frequent than complex declaratives, it could be expected that there was a tendency for
the model to associate the initial auxiliary with the ￿rst verb and therefore fail on the
E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ step early in development. To overcome this input bias the model had to
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learn that a relative clause was necessary to express multiple propositions in the same
sentence and that one of the propositions was linked to the embedded clause verb phrase.
Acquiring a notion of clause structure was a prerequisite for generalizing auxiliary inversion
to complex questions.
In order to test these hypotheses about the E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ component, the model
from section 3 was compared with a version that received a reduced message where
activation values in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ were scaled down from 1.0 to 0.05. This allowed
the model to still produce complex questions but it diminished the in￿uence of the message
on learning and generalization in two ways. First, active message features were less distinct
from silent ones which made di￿erent speech acts similar and more confusable. And
secondly, it increased the burden on the sequencing system in that learned representations
were in￿uenced more by input distributional properties over sentence forms than by their
underlying messages. Apart from the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, all other parameters were kept
constant, and 25 model subjects were trained on the same 500,000 input items and tested as
before. The results of this message manipulation are depicted in Figure 6. Solid lines
represent generalization in the model of Figure 3, dashed lines show behavior when the
activation strength of the message was reduced. Correct generalization here means that the
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Figure 6. Di￿erent generalization abilities in the model when the in￿uence of sentence
meaning was reduced in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, compared with a full message.
model produced the target sentence-initial auxiliary (F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿), a relative pronoun in the
target position and an embedded clause verb phrase with the target auxiliary
(E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿). Incorrect generalization was de￿ned by the same pattern except that the
embedded clause auxiliary was missing (E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ error). With the full message,
performance converged on the correct generalization after around 5 epochs. With the
reduced message, the model considered two di￿erent auxiliary inversion rules early in
development, one where the initial auxiliary was associated with the relative clause verb
phrase (and thus the auxiliary was omitted in this position), and another, correct rule where
the initial auxiliary belonged to the main clause verb (and thus the embedded auxiliary was
produced). After 3 epochs the erroneous generalization started to become dominant.
Eventually, the model lacking the full message arrived at the incorrect rule and produced
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more complex questions with E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ omitted (14.2% correct and 61.6% incorrect
productions at the end of training). Correct generalization was higher with the full message
than the reduced message (— = 7.1, SE = 0.09, ‰2(1) = 245, p < 0.001), indicating that
meaning was critical for structure-dependent auxiliary inversion.
Learning from identical input, the same architecture could display diverging
behavioral patterns. Thus, surface distributional regularities, such as lexical or word
category substructure frequencies, did not explain the model’s capacity to generalize to the
correct rule (see also Kam et al., 2008). At ￿rst glance this observation would seem
incompatible with results obtained by distributional learning accounts such as Reali &
Christiansen (2005). This study, however, modeled sentence classi￿cation rather than
incremental production and the tested items lacked the structural diversity of questions in
our test corpus. Both task and test items di￿ered from the Dual-path model approach. To
show consistency, we implemented the bigram-based learner of Reali and Christiansen and
trained it on the input to our model. It was then used to classify the complex questions with
subject-relative clauses from our test set. The grammatical version was preferred 100% of the
time, for each of the 25 distinct training sets our model subjects were exposed to. Thus, in
terms of bigram support, the input to our model was indistinguishable from the corpus of
child-directed speech used by Reali and Christiansen. Nevertheless, in sentence production
without meaning our model converged on the incorrect rule. This underlines our remark in
the introduction that biases for classi￿cation may be insu￿cient for production and
highlights the need to model auxiliary inversion in a language processing task (rather than
whole sentence classi￿cation). It also indicates that the addition of meaning to models of
language acquisition qualitatively changes what is being learned. Bigram frequencies at the
lexical or word category level (Lewis & Elman, 2001; Reali & Christiansen, 2005; Ambridge et
al., 2008) may only have an explanatory role within assumptions about the meaning that is
associated with these bigrams.
Although meaning constraints proved crucial for generalization, the model with full
message did not immediately arrive at the correct rule either but generated 22.5%
E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ errors early in training (￿rst test point, Figure 6). While the system had not
yet learned how the structure of meaning was linked to sentence forms, it had to rely mainly
on sequencing regularities in the input. In the majority of language input, a sentence-initial
auxiliary belonged to the sequentially ￿rst verb form (e.g., in all single-clause and
right-branching questions). Thus, early in development the initial auxiliary was matched to
the ￿rst verb in complex questions, resulting in E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ errors. Over time, the model
learned that the message could represent distinct propositions that were systematically
expressed in di￿erent clauses and in this manner, a notion of clause structure was gradually
acquired from experience. The model also learned that there were message components that
controlled embedded verb phrases and that relative clause forms never had an auxiliary
extracted. Message representations for relative clauses were identical across speech acts and
once the model started learning these partial mappings, E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ errors were
decreasing.
The two model variants contrasted here instantiate distinct hypotheses about how the
learning problem for auxiliary inversion constraints can be conceptualized. According to
Chomsky’s formulation (Chomsky, 1968, 1975, 1980), children should adopt a linear,
structure-independent rule given the evidence they receive from the ambient speech. The
reduced message version can be viewed as a model that tests this prediction. When critical
items with auxiliaries in both clauses were absent from the learning environment, and the
model had to induce auxiliary inversion rules from surface distributional properties alone, it
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converged on behavior where the sentence-initial auxiliary was linked to the embedded verb
phrase, and this supports Chomsky’s claim. On the alternative view that we propose here,
the induction of syntactic rules from surface forms is not the primary target in language
acquisition. Instead, our model learned to link sequences of words to an intended message,
and these mappings combined into larger meaningful utterances. The message re￿ected
semantic and pragmatic constraints on question formation, and partial meaning-form
mapping regularities generalized to novel constructions. Syntactic rules for auxiliary
inversion developed as a byproduct of learning the meaning and communicative function of
questions and relative clauses. Despite the fact that critical items were not encountered in
training, the model was driven towards behavior that resembled structure-dependent
auxiliary fronting.
Initial overgeneralization shows that the model did not have an innate syntactic
constraint built-in that would categorically prohibit the omission or displacement of an
embedded clause auxiliary. The message was not forcing the learning system to adopt the
correct rule from the outset. It was only through experience of meaning-form relations for
simple questions and complex declaratives that the correct pattern was being acquired. With
reduced message input, linguistic experience alone was insu￿cient and led to the wrong
generalization. Thus, neither message structure nor input properties in isolation explained
how auxiliary inversion was acquired. It was the complex interplay between these factors
from which structure-dependent generalization emerged.
5.3 Development of meaning
At this point it might be useful to clarify the status of the message in the proposed
account. As the previous simulation has shown, a structured message distinguishing speech
acts and multiple propositions was necessary for generalizing auxiliary inversion to complex
questions. Here we show that it is not required that this semantic/pragmatic infrastructure
be in place from the start of language acquisition. Our prior focus was on modeling the
development of auxiliary inversion from meaning, rather than the development of meaning
itself. Providing the full message from the beginning, we have merely taken a computational
shortcut which should not be understood as a commitment to meaning innateness. To
illustrate that generalization could also happen when the message became available
incrementally in the course of acquisition, we simulated the gradual development of
meaning where message components were partially blanked out. These components could
be individual R￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿ bindings or the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (see Figure 2). Thus, the
message could be missing information about who was the agent, theme or recipient in a
target utterance, or information about the entire event structure, including tense/aspect,
modality, and speech act distinctions. In this training protocol, early in acquisition none of
the message components were present and every 50,000 episodes another ≥10% of the
features were randomly added in. The full message was only available to the model during
the ￿nal 50,000 training sentences. In all other ways the model was identical to the previous
version. Figure 7 shows that structure-dependent generalization was delayed but eventually
an adult state was reached at the end of training (95.2% accuracy). The comparison
demonstrates that the assumption of full message input was not essential for learning the
F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ and E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ steps in complex question production. This suggests that as
children gradually acquire the meaning-form relations of basic constructions such as simple
interrogatives and relativization, correct generalization to more complex, composite
constructions becomes increasingly likely. The development of structured meaning itself,
which the present work does not address, might be grounded in elemental, presumably
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Figure 7 . Structure-dependent generalization when messages were developing over time,
compared with a model where full messages were available from the beginning of
acquisition.
innate, cognitive primitives for categorization, word learning, and the conceptual structuring
of perceptual experience (Palermo, 1982; A. L. Brown, 1990; Carey, 2009; Jackendo￿, 2002).
6 The role of the input
The F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ and E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ components in left-to-right question production,
and therefore structure-dependent generalization, were directly related to the structure of
meaning. The third production step was to omit the main clause auxiliary after exiting from
the embedded clause (S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿) and here we investigate how the composition of the
input could modulate the learning of this component. Auxiliaries at this position were
normally associated with the PROG feature when paired with complex declarative
utterances. Cameron-Faulkner et al. (2003) estimated that complex utterances with two
lexical verbs make up around 6% of child-directed speech and the number was comparable in
the model’s input (≥5%). Hence, there was positive evidence that could support the mapping
of PROG to an auxiliary before the main clause verb. In the target complex yes-no questions
with progressive aspect (and similarly for modal auxiliaries and copulas), however, the YSNO
feature signalled that there should be no auxiliary immediately preceding the verb form as
in all simple polar questions. Because of these con￿icting features, the model produced
many auxiliary doubling errors early in development and only gradually acquired
S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ towards the end of training.
High rates of auxiliary doubling have also been found in two production studies
(Crain & Nakayama, 1987; Ambridge et al., 2008) and this is di￿cult to explain for accounts
where auxiliary inversion is governed by innate movement rules. These ￿ndings rather
indicate that omission of the main clause auxiliary may be acquired through relevant
experience over an extended period of time. The Dual-path model approach was assuming
that direct evidence might be required to learn S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ in that 0.3% of the model’s
input were center-embedded polar questions with an auxiliary in the main clause, e.g.
(13) Is the boy that eats happy?
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In this section we examine whether this input assumption in￿uenced the rate of auxiliary
doubling errors (S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿) and whether it was critical for structure-dependent
generalization (F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ and E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿).
6.1 Manipulating the input distribution
To test the role of examples like (13), the same model was trained and tested as before
but without these structures in the input. The comparison shows that the exclusion of these
items from the learning environment had little e￿ect on structure-dependent generalization
(Figure 8, right panel). In both input conditions the model adopted the correct auxiliary
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Figure 8. Model performance with and without center-embedded yes-no questions with a
main clause auxiliary in the input, averaged over the ￿nal three test points. Neither input
condition contained center-embedded questions with two auxiliaries.
inversion pattern at the end of training (‰2(1) = 2.4, p = 0.12). Thus, the inclusion of a small
number of questions like (13) in the model’s input was not necessary to achieve
structure-dependent generalization. Simple polar questions and complex declaratives in the
learning environment were su￿cient for the model to converge on the correct behavior
(F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ and E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ steps). The amount of auxiliary doubling errors, on the
other hand, was strongly in￿uenced by the presence of items (13) in the model’s input
(Figure 8, left panel). Without these questions, the model more frequently reactivated the
main clause auxiliary after sequencing the relative clause (around 53% of the time) and the
di￿erence between input conditions was signi￿cant (‰2(1) = 48.7, p < 0.001). In other words,
the model was not reliably learning the S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ step in the absence of direct evidence.
Based on these results, we hypothesize that children require exposure to these, or
similar kinds of questions, in order to retreat from auxiliary doubling, and the high rate of
such errors found late in development supports this possibility in that even older children
aged 6;3–7;9 produced 24% auxiliary doubling errors out of all valid attempts (Ambridge et
al., 2008). In addition, the input manipulation shows that auxiliary doubling and
structure-dependent processing were largely independent in the model. Convergence on the
correct inversion rule was similar in both input conditions but auxiliary doubling di￿ered
signi￿cantly. Together with the results from section 5, this suggests that F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿,
E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, and S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ are three separate aspects of learning complex
questions which are governed by distinct, local meaning-form mapping regularities, and the
model needed to learn each of these regularities from relevant experience.
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6.2 Auxiliary doubling and bigram frequency
It has been argued that auxiliary doubling errors might be related to bigram
probabilities at the transition from relative clauses into the main clause (Ambridge et al.,
2008). On this view, if auxiliary repetition creates high frequency bigrams of word categories
(e.g., relative clause-￿nal NP + auxiliary), this should cause more doubling errors than lower
frequency bigrams (e.g., relative clause-￿nal VP + auxiliary). However, while bigram
frequency might correlate with error rates in children, it is not clear what the role of bigram
frequency is for learning to avoid auxiliary doubling, as adults typically do. The Dual-path
model produced large numbers of these errors early in development and eventually learned
to omit the auxiliary in the post-relative clause region, but it failed to do so when relevant
evidence was not provided (Figure 8, left panel). To determine the role of bigrams in
explaining this di￿erence, we calculated the frequency of bigrams occurring in test items at
the transition from the relative clause into the main clause. For example, if the test item was
Is the boy that is happy nice? the number of occurrences of happy is and happy nice in the
training set was counted, both at the lexical and word category level. The former bigram
would support auxiliary doubling, whereas the latter would support omission. In the input
condition without direct evidence, bigrams that supported doubling were approximately 23
times more frequent, lexically, and 4.7 times more frequent at the category level than
bigrams that supported omission. This would seem to suggest that auxiliary doubling can be
explained in terms of bigram frequency at the main clause transition and similar arguments
have been made to explain doubling in children (Ambridge et al., 2008). However, in the
input condition that did provide evidence against doubling, only 0.3% of the model’s training
set di￿ered and the e￿ect on bigram frequencies was therefore marginal (the above factors
changed to 22 and 4.6, respectively). Bigram probabilities still supported auxiliary doubling,
and yet the model’s behavior changed dramatically from high to low error rates. This
suggests that surface distributional properties of the input, such as the frequency of lexical
and word category subsequences, may not be critical, unless one considers how they are
associated with meaning. It also indicates that frequency-based accounts, where
child-language data is correlated with input statistics need to be tested in concrete learning
models that are sensitive to these properties. Causal explanations can then be obtained
through manipulations of the input environment from which the models learn. The
Dual-path model could retreat from auxiliary doubling based on sparse evidence because it
was learning to link word order regularities at the main clause transition in a few positive
examples to an underlying message representation. In this manner, it could overcome
surface distributional biases and acquire the correct syntax for complex questions where
main clause auxiliaries are not duplicated. As with structure dependence, adding meaning
into the equation qualitatively changed what was being learned even if di￿erences in the
input were very small. Consequently, postulating absolute frequency thresholds for the
learnability of constructions (Legate & Yang, 2002) may be premature.
6.3 Support from child-directed speech
In order to learn S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, the model required direct evidence against auxiliary
doubling in the form of complex questions with a main clause copula or auxiliary (e.g., Is the
boy that eats happy?). To determine if this learning account was supported by child-directed
speech, we searched the Thomas corpus (Lieven, Salomo, & Tomasello, 2009) from the
CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000) for similar utterances. Our version of the corpus
was not morpho-syntactically annotated, so PERL regular expressions were used to extract
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items which were then manually inspected. Since there is not guarantee that all relevant
items were picked up, the reported estimates are conservative. The corpus contained a total
of 336,030 maternal utterances recorded over a period of three years (age 2;0–4;11). Mother
and child were recorded for 5 hours a week between age 2;0 and 3;2 (5 hours ◊ 56 weeks =
280 hours) and for 5 hours within one week for every month until 5 years old (22 months ◊
5 hours = 110 hours). There were 98,131 questions in the corpus (29.2% of all utterances),
52,628 of which were marked by intonation or question tags. The remaining 45,503
questions (46%) were canonical in form, i.e., polar questions with subject-auxiliary inversion
or wh-questions. Short form questions without predicate were not counted as canonical (e.g.,
Are you?). 1,456 canonical questions had a relative clause with or without overt relative
pronoun, including fused relative clauses (e.g., Is that what you’re saying?) but excluding
reduced relative clauses (e.g., Can you see the hands moving on the clock?). Thus, complex
questions appeared to be quite frequent (3.2% of all canonical questions) and relative clauses
in a question context could help children to recognize that their surface form and
semantic-pragmatic function does not di￿er across speech acts.
Out of the canonical complex questions, 1,194 items were polar questions (77%) and
262 were wh-questions (23%). 1,422 (98%) items had an auxiliary in the main clause (copula,
progressive aspect, modal, or do-support), and 651 (45%) had an auxiliary in the relative
clause. Auxiliaries in both clauses occurred in 630 questions (43%). Except for the two items
listed below, complex questions were right-branching and the relative clause did not
interrupt the main clause verb phrase.
(14) How can yoghurt that comes out of the fridge be hot? [2;11]
(15) Was that cheese you had from the fruit lorry not nice? [4;01]
Since neither one of these questions had an auxiliary in the relative clause, these ￿ndings are
consistent with the claim that direct evidence for structure dependence is rare in typical
child-directed speech (Chomsky, 1980; Legate & Yang, 2002; MacWhinney, 2004).
Nevertheless, these utterances are important because they provide positive evidence for
auxiliary omission when returning to the main clause from an embedding. Although two
items are few (density 2/390 hours = 0.005128), the corpus is just a small subset of the input
Thomas received. If we arbitrarily assume that the child heard language for four hours a day,
every day for 14 years (365 ◊ 4 ◊ 14 = 20,440 hours), then Thomas should have heard at
least 104 examples of type (14) and (15) which provide evidence against auxiliary doubling.
Further direct evidence for omission comes from complex wh-questions like
(16) Where is the little lorry that came with this? [4;09]
which can be viewed as the interrogative counterpart to the declarative
(17) The little lorry that came with this is [in the box/on the shelf/etc.]
where the main clause auxiliary does not recur after the relative clause. The Thomas corpus
contained 174 such complex wh-questions with a main clause auxiliary (0.38% of all
canonical questions) and based on their distribution in the corpus we estimated that their
frequency was increasing by age (b = 0.0026, p < 0.05). In addition to items like (14) and
(15), these questions can provide children with evidence for auxiliary omission in the
post-relative clause region. By the same density argument as above, Thomas should have
heard at least 9,198 complex wh-questions with a main clause auxiliary by the age of 14, and
these numbers will be higher if older children get more complex input than a ￿ve-year old
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and hear language for longer than four hours a day. Thus, there is clearly a substantial
amount of input that children can use to learn about suppressing the main clause auxiliary
following a relative clause.
Learning auxiliary omission in the Dual-path model (S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿) required positive
evidence and corpus data suggests that such evidence might be available to children in
various forms. The presence of complex questions with a main clause auxiliary was not
necessary for achieving structure-dependent generalization, but it helped to reduce auxiliary
doubling errors over time. A small amount of these items was su￿cient because the model
could link substructures at the main clause transition to meaning representations and thus
overcome input distributional biases towards auxiliary doubling. Manipulations of the
model’s message and input environment demonstrate the complex interplay between
meaning-based constraints and language experience in the acquisition of auxiliary inversion.
7 Discussion
The present work investigated whether a computational model of sentence production
could simulate the acquisition of auxiliary inversion from meaning and generalize to novel
polar questions in a structure-dependent way. Structure dependence is often discussed in
terms of learned versus innate constraints, which has created an unfortunate divide (see also
Yang, 2004; Pearl & Lidz, 2009; A. Clark & Lappin, 2011) between seemingly incompatible
views and one of the aims of this work was to ￿nd some common ground. Auxiliary
inversion is a rare phenomenon in languages of the world (Siemund, 2001; Goldberg, 2006)
and all theories assume that it requires learning about English auxiliaries, progressive verbs,
and embedded clause structures. Learning and appropriate input are therefore essential in
all accounts of this phenomenon. In nativist accounts, structure dependence is part of
Universal Grammar and encoded into the initial state of the language system (Crain, 1991;
Berwick et al., 2011; Crain & Thornton, 2012). Together with linguistic experience it
becomes a particular learned grammar (Chomsky, 1983). Although this approach is
conceptually simple, a computational implementation that instantiates its solution is still
lacking. It is unclear how prior syntactic knowledge could be represented by the initial state,
how it would interact with experience, and how observed production errors (Nakayama,
1987; Crain & Nakayama, 1987; Ambridge et al., 2008) could be explained in this framework.
Constructivist approaches have argued that the input itself provides constraints that
learning and experience can turn into a structure-dependent grammar (Reali & Christiansen,
2005; Ambridge et al., 2008; Ambridge et al., 2014). The explanatory burden, however, cannot
be shifted entirely onto the input and its distributional make up. Generalization to novel
instances requires inductive biases that cannot themselves be learned (Mitchell, 1997;
Pinker, 2004). Thus, even if the input contains relevant direct (Pullum & Scholz, 2002; Scholz
& Pullum, 2002) or indirect evidence (Reali & Christiansen, 2005), it would still have to be
explained which biases are needed within a formal learning account to make use of this
information and generalize beyond experience. Input is the oil that lubes the acquisition
machinery, but it is not the machinery itself.
Existing computational models have employed a range of biases to demonstrate that
auxiliary inversion can be learned in the absence of positive exemplars, without assuming
innate syntactic, or other constraints speci￿c to language. These domain-general biases,
however, appear to be too weak (see also Berwick et al., 2011). The models of Reali &
Christiansen (2005) and Bod (2009) recognized ungrammatical forms which is distinct from
the ability to produce grammatical sentences. The SRN of Lewis & Elman (2001) activated a
probability distribution over words at each sentence position but did not generate
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well-formed questions. By design, the learner of A. Clark & Eyraud (2007) could not
generalize to novel questions which were unsupported by relevant contexts, and the
Bayesian model of Perfors et al. (2011) did not explain how grammars in the hypothesis
space were learned in the ￿rst place. Thus, approaches that have focussed on distributional
properties of the input have thus far not yielded working models that can learn to generate
auxiliary inversion questions to an adult degree. The approach proposed here modeled the
production of complex questions from meaning and acquired adult knowledge of auxiliary
inversion where less than 1% of produced utterances were incorrect. It has wider coverage
than previous models in terms of the distinct complex question types that were produced
correctly. These included questions with copulas, di￿erent tensed and modal auxiliaries,
do-support, and a variety of relative clauses. Moreover, the model’s learning trajectories
were found to be consistent with ￿ne-grained developmental di￿erences regarding di￿erent
auxiliaries, relative clause type, and relative clause length.
In our approach, we have attempted to make explicit both the nature of the biases as
well as the role of the input that is required to learn complex question formation. Our results
suggest that constraints on auxiliary inversion can arise not only from statistical regularities
in the language input, or from preset syntactic knowledge, but also from the very meaning
that is conveyed in sentence production. If language acquisition involves learning to map
between meaning and form, the structure of meaning can constrain the way the language
system interacts with experience and restrict the space of learnable grammars. This allowed
the model to produce complex polar questions in a structure-dependent way without
positive exemplars in the input. When language acquisition was rendered ‘meaningless’,
however, the model converged on the wrong behavior. When the sentence message was
made available in piecemeal fashion over development, the model generalized to the novel
questions equally well. The assumption that the full message was present from the
beginning was therefore not critical in our approach, it was su￿cient when structured
meaning developed gradually due to other cognitive abilities and their own set of biases.
Furthermore, embedded auxiliary omission occurred early in development even in the
presence of a structured message. Hence, structure-independent grammars were accessible
during acquisition, and not removed from the model space by prior knowledge. Structured
meaning was acting as a soft bias on the distributional learning mechanism, rather than as a
categorical constraint on the system’s initial state. These ￿ndings suggest that the syntax of
auxiliary inversion was not reducible to the conceptual structure in the message, it was only
through the interaction of nonlinguistic meaning and linguistic experience that structure
dependence could emerge.
One assumption of our approach is that messages for sentence production were
divided up into individual propositions (e.g., JUMP(BOY) and RUN(BOY)) that mapped onto
clause-like units. We also assumed that speech act distinctions were represented in the
message. This approach di￿ers from non-structured theories of meaning such as
distributional semantics (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Schütze, 1998). If the meaning of words,
phrases and sentences like Is the boy that is jumping running? would be a point in a
multi-dimensional state space, without internal structure, it would be non-trivial to extract
the dimensions that encode each proposition. Given the di￿culty in separating propositions,
it would be hard to mark the fact that the boy is jumping is given information and shared
between the speaker and the listener, while the fact that the boy is running is perhaps known
by the listener, but not the speaker. Without the ability to entertain each of these two
propositions in isolation, it becomes di￿cult to understand why a complex question would
be asked in the ￿rst place. In contrast, the structured approach to meaning argues that
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humans perceive events in terms of proposition-like units. Structured meaning is assumed
in most theories of adult language (Bock & Levelt, 1994; St. John & McClelland, 1990;
Mayberry et al., 2009; Kintsch, 1988; Anderson et al., 2004; Chang et al., 2006; Jackendo￿,
2002, Gärdenfors, 2014), and the only question, in our view, is whether these abilities
become available early enough to support auxiliary inversion. There is substantial evidence
for the early development of sophisticated social cognition abilities, which require multiple
propositions (e.g., theory of mind tasks; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), and which involve
marking some propositions as shared and some as private (Tomasello et al., 2005). There is
also evidence for some of these abilities in other species (e.g., chimpanzee A understands the
proposition that chimpanzee B has seen the food hidden under a particular bucket;
Tomasello et al., 2003), which suggests that structured meaning may have evolved in human
evolution. Many of these early social cognition results would be di￿cult to explain within a
non-structured theory of meaning, where the basic unit of an event or proposition is not
distinctly represented.
We are, of course, not the ￿rst to argue that children can use meaning, or other rich
sources of information, in the acquisition of grammar (e.g., Wexler & Culicover, 1980;
Pinker, 1984; Steedman, 1996; see the discussion in A. Clark & Lappin, 2011). On these
approaches, meaning is inferred from a shared visual environment, situational context, and
speaker intentions, and then gets mapped onto syntactic categories in acquisition. This idea
is considered problematic because meaning-form relations can be opaque in any given
language, they vary across languages, and conceptual structure itself is shaped by language
and culture (Levinson, 2003). In the Dual-path model, the acquisition relation between
meaning and form was more complicated. Abstract syntactic frames developed through
distributional learning in the sequencing system. In situated comprehension, inferred
meaning and developing syntax jointly generated internal predictions about upcoming
words which in turn drove syntactic development through error-based learning. In
production, conceptual structure constrained how syntactic knowledge was used to express
an intended message and learned syntax, in turn, could inform the meaning system when to
activate conceptual content in novel messages. The link between meaning and form was
bidirectional, and language was acquired through interacting pathways for syntax and
meaning. The learned grammar was more than a simple one-one correspondence between
conceptual and syntactic categories. It got encoded into thousands of synaptic connections
which were ￿ne-tuned in the acquisition process to satisfy multiple constraints—including
structure dependence—on how meaning relates to form. The addition of meaning into
language acquisition models has also been studied in formal learning theory, within the
framework of ‘identi￿ability in the limit’. When language acquisition is conceptualized as
grammar induction from surface strings, plausible classes of candidate grammars for natural
language are unlearnable (Gold, 1967, but see Shinohara, 1994). However, if grammar
denotes a mapping between phonetic and meaning representations, rather than a device for
generating strings, language acquisition becomes the process of identifying a function.
Assuming that pairs of overheard utterances and their inferred meanings are available to
children, every class of computable mappings turns out to learnable in this paradigm (Jain,
1999). In a formally precise sense, procedures for language acquisition that have access to
meaning are more powerful than those for extracting natural language grammars from
sentence form alone.
Errors in development provide important information about the acquisition paths
children take in learning auxiliary inversion. Previous accounts were not able to replicate
the errors that children typically make, e.g., the highly frequent auxiliary doubling errors.
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When the model of Bod (2009) was used to generate (rather than parse) complex questions,
it produced around 7% of sentence forms that resembled auxiliary doubling which is well
below the error rates found in children. It also generated 46% of error types that were not
observed in children. Models that attribute errors to high frequency n-grams (Lewis &
Elman, 2001; Reali & Christiansen, 2005) cannot explain how children recover from these
errors, unless they assume that the input distribution or the learning mechanism changes
over development. In our approach, we replicated the distinct types of children’s errors in
elicited production and their distribution over development within the same model that had
reached adult production accuracy. Informed by these error patterns, we proposed an
account of complex questions where incremental processing was factored into three
independent components (F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, and S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿). A step-wise
learning account has also been suggested for auxiliary inversion in simple questions
(Estigarribia, 2009). We then identi￿ed input structures that were necessary for the model to
recover from auxiliary doubling errors and found evidence for these structures in a large
corpus of child-directed speech. Again, the role of meaning was critical here since a small
amount of positive evidence allowed the model to overcome strong distributional biases and
recover from auxiliary doubling. Thus, meaning can decorrelate frequency of occurrence
and successful acquisition, and our ￿ndings suggest that it might play a particularly
important role in the acquisition of syntactic principles when input evidence is sparse.
Reproducing errors required an architecture that was more complicated than previous
approaches which modeled language acquisition as the probabilistic selection of appropriate
utterances, structures or grammars from a set of alternatives (Reali & Christiansen, 2005;
Bod, 2009; Perfors et al., 2011). One could imagine a meaning-based variant of this task,
where meaning is used to reduce the set of alternatives that are being considered (see e.g.,
Fitz, 2010). This would not change the fact, however, that the task assumes utterance
planning to involve the generation of multiple whole sentence alternatives from which one
is selected, and this is inconsistent with a large body of evidence supporting the view that
language processing is incremental (e.g., Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Altmann & Kamide, 1999;
Sedivy et al., 1999; Ferreira & Swets, 2002). To implement an incremental account of
language production, the Dual-path model augmented the sequence processor of Lewis &
Elman (2001) with a meaning system to guide structural choices. It generated sentences one
word at a time and it had to learn language-speci￿c constraints from input structures and
meaning that informed this word-by-word generation process.
One consequence of incremental production was the model’s the ability to generate
errors which resulted when one of the components of question production failed. For
example, auxiliary doubling errors occurred when the main clause auxiliary was not yet
deleted from its position next to the verb, even when it had been produced at the start of the
sentence. The model was able to explain how these errors changed over development
because it learned each component of the task separately and they developed at di￿erent
rates. For instance, S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ took more time to learn and hence doubling errors were
created for a longer period in development. Thus, incremental production enabled us to
explain a wider range of data about the acquisition of complex questions. Another aspect
was that the Dual-path model captured the unique semantic relationship between question
forms and their declarative counterparts (Berwick et al., 2011). Questions were
systematically related to declaratives in that they shared a common message distinguished
only by a feature that determined the speech act type. This allowed the model to express the
same proposition in declarative or interrogative form. Complex questions were
unambiguously tied to their correct interpretation, not via a transformational rule over
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forms, but via shared meaning. This link between speech acts was causal in that message
similarity enabled the model to generalize partial meaning-form mappings from one
construction to another. As the model was learning to incrementally produce one form, the
acquired representations directly in￿uenced the acquisition of the complementary form.
In line with constructivist approaches, previous computational models have focused
on the role of the input in explaining auxiliary inversion in complex questions. Each of these
models used a di￿erent corpus from a di￿erent child and there is little evidence that they
would work if trained on other child language data. Most of these corpora come from play
sessions in which the parent and child are playing in a joint space where there is often
shared information about many objects. Auxiliary inversion questions are used to request
information about the past history of objects that is only known by one participant. Thus,
existing child-directed spoken corpora may not be the most representative corpora for the
utterances that could support complex question acquisition. Our meaning-based approach
argues that the composition of the input might be less important than previous accounts
have claimed. Instead, the input is linked to di￿erent parts of the message for each
proposition, and the message smoothes over variation in the input. The Dual-path model
learns to activate semantic roles at particular sentence positions and this helps to address
gaps in linguistic experience. For example, if the model hears an object-relativized
declarative, it can learn to activate the agent role of the embedded proposition and then the
auxiliary. If the agent changes in a novel message, the same processing steps can yield an
object-relativized complex question with di￿erent event participants. This form of
generalization is related to systematicity in language (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) and the
Dual-path model has been shown to behave strongly systematic in Chang (2002) and Fitz
(2009). The message allows the system to correctly produce utterances that have not
appeared in the learning environment.
Although input is required in all di￿erent accounts of auxiliary inversion, there is a
cline in the amount that is needed. Word-based learning accounts like Lewis & Elman (2001)
and Reali & Christiansen (2005) require that every child hear every bigram that is necessary
to select the appropriate structure. Syntactic category-based learners (Bod, 2009; Perfors et
al., 2011) require less input as they need just one example of a target sequence of categories
for each child. Generative accounts have the smallest input requirements as they only need
enough to learn English words and any structures that trigger auxiliary inversion rules. The
Dual-path model occupies the middle ground as its message and semantic categories help it
to generalize over words. Meaning representations in the present account were much the
same as in previous work with the Dual-path model (Chang, 2002; Chang, Dell, & Bock,
2006; Fitz, 2009; Twomey, Chang, & Ambridge, 2014; Chang, Baumann, Pappert, & Fitz,
2015). Both Chang (2009) and Fitz, Chang, & Christiansen (2011) used a message with
multiple propositions to produce complex declaratives with simple and progressive aspect.
Only the inclusion of the YSNO feature associated with interrogative forms was novel in the
current model. Due to the similarity of the present representations with those in previous
model versions, the message format is motivated by its capacity to explain a wide range of
psycholinguistic phenomena like structural priming, heavy NP shift and relative clause
acquisition.
In this work, we have emphasized the role of a structured message in explaining the
acquisition of structure-dependent representations. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that structured meaning needs to be embedded in a theory of syntactic development and
incremental production for which the Dual-path model provides a template. We are able to
explain the developmental time-course of auxiliary inversion because F￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿,
LEARNING AUXILIARY INVERSION 40
E￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿, and S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿ regularities are learned gradually at di￿erent rates and
are activated incrementally in production. Future work needs to address whether
structure-dependent syntactic principles beyond auxiliary inversion might be rooted in the
structure of meaning as well.
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Appendix
A.1 Model speci￿cations
Simulations were run in the LENS connectionist software package (version 2.63;
Rohde, 1999). Unless otherwise stated, default parameters of the simulator were used. To
allow for exact replication, the complete model on which simulations were based is available
at:
The model’s sequencing system mapped from the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer (83 units) to
the CC￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer (15 units) which connected to a H￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (70 units), through the
C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer (15 units) and to the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer (83 units). A C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer (70
units) held a copy of the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer activation at the previous time step and was fully
connected to the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer. At the start of each utterance, all C￿￿￿￿￿￿ units were reset
to 0.5. The P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer used the softmax activation function
oi =
exiqn
j=1 e
xj
(1)
to create a continuous winner-take-all bias for that layer, where xi is the net input to the ith
output unit and oi is its output. The P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer received one-to-one inputs from
all of the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer units and from the previous target outputs, and a
winner-take-all ￿lter was applied to increase the output signal-to-noise ratio. During
learning from the speech of others, the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ input was set to the sum of the
overheard target word and the model’s own internal word predictions.
Messages were stored in the weights between the R￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿ bindings (Figure 2,
top panel, right), which consisted of the R￿￿￿ layer (8 units) and the C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer (64
units). The H￿￿￿￿￿ layer connected to the R￿￿￿ layer, which connected to the C￿￿￿￿￿￿
layer. The C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer, in turn, connected to the P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer. The model
assumed that this “production message” was set by the shared visual scene when learning
from others, or by the speaker’s own message planning during production. The weights
between the R￿￿￿ and C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layers were initially cleared, then for a particular message
the R￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿ bindings between appropriate units (e.g., A￿￿￿￿1=DOG) were set to a
weight of 6 and these weights did not change with learning. Similarly, to allow the model to
recognize the role of previously produced words, a “comprehension message” was employed
(Figure 2, top panel, left). It was identical to the production message, except that the
direction was reversed, mapping from concepts to roles, via weights between the CC￿￿￿￿￿￿
(64 units) and CR￿￿￿ (8 units) layers. The CR￿￿￿￿CC￿￿￿￿￿￿ bindings were set
simultaneously with the R￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿ bindings, with a weight of 6.
The P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layer connected to the CC￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer, which connected to the
CR￿￿￿ layer, which in turn connected to the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer (Figure 2, top panel, left). To
ensure the model could avoid producing roles that had already been produced, there was
also a CR￿￿￿ C￿￿￿ layer (8 units; Figure 2, top panel, center) which averaged a copy of its
own activation with the previous activation of the CR￿￿￿ layer. To help the model learn the
links between the previous word and its appropriate concept (i.e., the weights between the
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ and CC￿￿￿￿￿￿ layers, Fig. 1, top panel, left), the previous activation of the
C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer was used as a training signal for the CC￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer (light grey line, Figure
2). Finally, the meaning system also included an E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer (22 units)
connected to the H￿￿￿￿￿ layer. The R￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿￿ links in the production message, the
CC￿￿￿￿￿￿￿CR￿￿￿ links in the comprehension message, and E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ activations
were all set before a training or test sentence was processed.
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Unless speci￿ed otherwise, units in all layers used the logistic activation function,
with activation values running between 0 and 1. Weights were initially set to values
uniformly sampled between -1 and 1. Units were unbiased in order to make layers more
dependent on their inputs for their behavior. However, C￿￿￿￿￿￿ and CC￿￿￿￿￿￿ units were
biased to -3 to ensure that they had a low default activation level.
A.2 Training
A version of backpropagation was used to train the model where derivatives were
clipped at 1.0 (Doug’s momentum; Rohde, 1999). Momentum was set to 0.9 throughout
training. Weights were updated after each message-sentence pair had been trained; the term
episode refers to the time taken to train one message-sentence pair, an epoch comprises
20,000 episodes. To simulate the gradual reduction in plasticity over development (Johnson
& Newport, 1989), the learning rate started at 0.17 for the ￿rst 400,000 training pairs and was
gradually lowered to 0.001 over the remaining 100,000 pairs. the learning rate for
connections from P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ to CC￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ was set to a constant of 0.25 to counteract
a vanishing gradient in lower layers. To prevent over￿tting and improve generalization,
connection weights were set to decay by a fraction of 5◊10≠7 following each episode.
Training ended after 500,000 sentences had been processed.
Error during training was measured in terms of divergence between target and
produced words:
Divergence error =
nÿ
i=1
ti log
ti
oi
(2)
where ti is the target activation of the ith output unit and oi its actual output value on the
current word input. Divergence is the natural choice of loss function for softmax output
units (Bishop, 1996).
Training began by randomizing all weights and the same seed was used for all runs.
Model subjects di￿ered in terms of the set of training items they were exposed to. At the
start of each utterance, the message was set and did not change throughout production.
After the sentence was generated, the sequence of P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ activations was
processed by a decoder program that yielded the produced sentence. Sentences were then
processed by a syntactic coder program that added the syntactic and message tags. The
model’s output was compared with the target sentence and an utterance was considered
accurate if all the words and in￿ectional morphemes were correctly produced.
A.3 Input grammar
Input to the model consisted of message-sentence pairs generated from a grammar.
The grammar included various concepts that were organized into several categories, for
example LIVING (MAN, WOMAN, CAT, DOG, BOY, GIRL, etc.), and OBJECT (BALL, STICK, TOY,
KITE, APPLE, CAKE, etc.). There were three action categories, each containing eight action
concepts. One of these action categories corresponded to the intransitive verb class
(ACTION-INTR, e.g., JUMP, DANCE), one to the simple transitive class (ACTION-TRANS, e.g.,
PUSH, HIT), and one to the dative class (ACTION-DAT, e.g., GIVE, THROW). Message-sentence
pairs were generated from paired message/sentence templates. The message template
speci￿ed the set of roles that should be ￿lled and the type of category that should ￿ll these
roles. For example, the dative template would have role slots for A￿￿￿￿1, T￿￿￿￿1 and
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R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1, with the A￿￿￿￿1 and R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 role ￿lled by the LIVING category. To create a
speci￿c message, each role was ￿lled by randomly selecting a concept from the appropriate
category. For example, when a message stipulated A￿￿￿￿1=LIVING, the A￿￿￿￿1 role might
be ￿lled with the concept MAN. The sentence template that was paired with the message
template speci￿ed how the message mapped onto a word order. For example, the transitive
sentence template speci￿ed that A￿￿￿￿1 came ￿rst, followed by A￿￿￿￿￿1, then T￿￿￿￿1.
The input grammar also included a copular construction where the predicate was
instantiated from a class ADJ of eight adjective concepts (NICE, PRETTY, BIG, SMALL, etc.).
Copular verbs were drawn from the AUX class which contained the auxiliaries is, was, did,
does, can, and could. To distinguish the copular construction from action constructions, the
latter used a feature AA in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. Messages also contained information
about tense (past and present) and aspect (simple and progressive) which was represented
by TENSE and ASPECT features in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. Simple present tense was the
default (tense and aspect features were silent) and past tense and progressive aspect were
marked by active PAST and PROG features, respectively. This default was motivated by the
fact that present tense auxiliaries were roughly three times as frequent as past tense
auxiliaries in child-directed speech (Thomas corpus; Lieven, Salomo, & Tomasello, 2009).
In￿ectional su￿xes for tense and aspect were represented as separate words (e.g., run -ing;
push -ed) to keep the number of word input and output units small (P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ and
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ layers).
Constructions could be instantiated in declarative or interrogative form and a speech
act feature represented this distinction in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. Since in child-directed
speech declaratives were slightly more frequent than questions (Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven,
& Tomasello, 2003), they were made the default speech act (silent feature) and questions
were marked with an active YSNO feature. Each noun phrase in the language was either a
lexical noun preceded by a de￿nite determiner or a case-marked pronoun (he, she, it, him,
her). Pronouns were represented by a link from the R￿￿￿ layer to a concept PRN in the
C￿￿￿￿￿￿ layer and the activation of the lexical content of the noun phrase was half as
strong (weight = 3) than usual. Although the input grammar generator contained
information about syntactic categories, verb classes, structural types, and word order
di￿erences between questions and declaratives, the model was not given this information.
Rather, it had to develop appropriate representations from the variability and distributional
properties of the input.
Action constructions could also occur with modal auxiliaries (e.g, The dog can carry
the toy; Could the boy run?) and modality was encoded in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ by replacing
the action feature AA with a MODAL feature. When questions occurred with simple aspect,
do-support was enabled (e.g., Does the dog carry the toy?; Did the boy run?). Thus, the
combination of tense, aspect, action and speech act features determined the verb phrase that
had to be produced and the model had to acquire these distinctions and how they were
expressed in English from experience. Table 4 shows all basic constructions permitted by the
grammar.
From these basic constructions, complex templates for utterances with relative clauses
were created. To limit the complexity of the model’s language input, these constructions
could have copular, intransitive, transitive and dative relative clauses but no dative main
clauses. In total, there were 27 distinct complex construction templates in the grammar.
They generated right-branching and center-embedded relative clauses with subject (e.g., The
boy was holding the orange that was big; The boy that was pretty was holding the toy), direct
object (e.g., The apple that the boy was holding was nice) and indirect object gaps (e.g., The cat
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that the boy gave the cake to was cute). All constructions could occur in declarative and
interrogative form, including complex do-support questions (e.g., Does the boy that eats the
cake run?). Moreover, tense, aspect and modality permitted in the basic constructions could
occur in any combination within relative clause constructions. Complex center-embedded
questions with two auxiliaries, however, never occurred in the training set (e.g., Is the boy
that can jump lazy?). They were used only in testing to assess the model’s ability to
generalize auxiliary inversion to these novel utterances.
Table 4
Basic constructions in the input grammar
Copular
Assertion Question
Event semantics TH1, PAST1 TH1, YSNO
Message template T￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING, OBJECT T￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING, OBJECT
A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ADJ A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ADJ
Sentence template T￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿ A￿￿￿￿￿1 T￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿ A￿￿￿￿￿1
Sentence examples She was pretty. Is the apple big?
Intransitive
Assertion Question
Event semantics TH1, AA1, PAST1 TH1, AA1, PROG1, YSNO
Message template T￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING T￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING
A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ACTION-INTR A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ACTION-INTR
Sentence template T￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿ T￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿￿￿￿1
Sentence examples The boy jump -ed. Is the boy run -ing?
Transitive
Assertion Question
Event semantics AG1, TH1, AA1, PROG1 AG1, TH1, AA1, PAST1, YSNO
Message template A￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING A￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING
A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ACTION-TRAN A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ACTION-TRAN
T￿￿￿￿1 = OBJECT T￿￿￿￿1 = OBJECT
Sentence template A￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿￿￿￿1 T￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿ A￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿￿￿￿1 T￿￿￿￿1
Sentence examples The woman is push -ing the ball. Was the girl hit -ing the toy?
Dative
Assertion Question
Event semantics AG1, TH1, RE1, AA1, PAST1 AG1, TH1, RE1, AA1, PROG1, YSNO
Message template A￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING A￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING
A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ACTION-DAT A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ACTION-DAT
T￿￿￿￿1 = OBJECT T￿￿￿￿1 = OBJECT
R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING
Sentence template A￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿￿￿￿1 T￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿ A￿￿ A￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿￿￿￿1 T￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿
R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1
Sentence examples The cat give -ed the toy to the dog. Is the man throw -ing the stick to the dog?
Note. Features in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ signaled the thematic nature of event participants
(AG1 = A￿￿￿￿1, TH1 = T￿￿￿￿1, RE1 = R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1), and the tense, aspect, action and speech
act type of the target utterance.
In order to encode the meaning of complex utterances with multiple propositions, two
sets of roles were used in the R￿￿￿ and C￿￿￿￿ layers (e.g., A￿￿￿￿1 and R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2).
Likewise, there were duplicate sets of features in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ to encode tense and
aspect (e.g., PAST1, PROG2) and the number of event participants in each proposition (e.g.,
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TH1 and AG2). There was only one speech act feature YSNO which was neutral between
propositions. Thus, the model had to learn from the structures in the input that the
questioned proposition was always in the main clause. To express two propositions using a
relative clause, speakers must know that one participant is co-referential across
propositions; it is the same boy who is big who is also running in The boy that is running is
big. To encode co-reference in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, binding features were used for each
combination of thematic roles. For example, if the A￿￿￿￿1 of the main clause event was the
T￿￿￿￿2 of the embedded clause event, a feature AG1-TH2 represented the fact that the event
participants linked to these roles were co-referential. To illustrate the structure of the
message underlying complex utterances, 3 of the 27 constructions were selected which cover
the critical distinctions (Table 5). Here, we focus on complex questions, messages for the
corresponding assertions had the YSNO feature omitted and were identical otherwise.
Table 5
Example complex question constructions in the input grammar
Progressive aspect and modal auxiliary, right-branching direct object-relative clause
Event semantics AG1, TH1, AA1, PROG1; AG2, TH2, MODAL2; TH1-TH2; YSNO
Message template A￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING, A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ACTION-TRAN, T￿￿￿￿1 = OBJECT
A￿￿￿￿2 = LIVING, A￿￿￿￿￿2 = ACTION-TRAN, T￿￿￿￿2 = OBJECT
Sentence template A￿￿ A￿￿￿￿1 A￿￿￿￿￿1 T￿￿￿￿1 that A￿￿￿￿2 A￿￿ A￿￿￿￿￿2
Sentence examples Is the boy hit -ing the toy that he can push?
Do-support, one auxiliary, center-embedded subject-relative clause
Event semantics TH1, AA1; AG2, TH2, AA2, PAST2; TH1-AG2; YSNO
Message template T￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING, A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ACTION-INTR
A￿￿￿￿2 = LIVING, A￿￿￿￿￿2 = ACTION-TRAN, T￿￿￿￿2 = OBJECT
Sentence template A￿￿ T￿￿￿￿1 that A￿￿￿￿￿2 T￿￿￿￿2 A￿￿￿￿￿1
Sentence examples Does the dog that push -ed the toy jump?
Progressive aspect, two auxiliaries, center-embedded indirect object-relative clause
Event semantics TH1, PAST1; AG2, TH2, RE2, PROG2; TH1-RE2; YSNO
Message template T￿￿￿￿1 = LIVING, OBJECT, A￿￿￿￿￿1 = ADJ
A￿￿￿￿2 = LIVING, A￿￿￿￿￿2 = ACTION-DAT, T￿￿￿￿2 = OBJECT,
R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 = LIVING
Sentence template A￿￿ T￿￿￿￿1 that A￿￿￿￿2 A￿￿ A￿￿￿￿￿2 T￿￿￿￿2 to A￿￿￿￿￿1
Sentence examples Was the woman that she is give -ing the cake to nice?
Note. Two sets of roles and features in the E￿￿￿￿ S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ encoded the two di￿erent
propositions. Binding features encoded the co-reference of event participants for the
production of complex utterances, e.g., TH1-AG2 signaled that the main clause T￿￿￿￿1 was
the embedded clause A￿￿￿￿2. The ￿rst two example complex questions could occur in the
training set (see section 6), the third example could occur in the test set only.
A.4 Input and test distribution
To train the model, 50,000 message-sentence pairs were randomly generated from this
grammar, subject to the following distributional restrictions. 95.1% of the training items were
single-clause structures, half of which were assertions and half simple polar questions. This
ratio re￿ects corpus evidence that both types of speech acts are similar in frequency within
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the speech to children, with assertions being slightly more frequent (Cameron-Faulkner et
al., 2003; Legate & Yang, 2002). Basic constructions in the grammar (Table 4) occurred with
the same frequency in the training set for both assertions and questions. 4.9% of the input
items contained a relative clause which is consistent with corpus-based ￿ndings concerning
complex construction frequency (Cameron-Faulkner et al., 2003). Assertions with a
right-branching or center-embedded relative clause were approximately equally frequent to
ensure that both constructions were learned to an adult degree at the end of training. 1.6% of
items in the input were questions with a relative clause and 0.3% had a center-embedded
relative clause. Both assumptions were motivated by child language data from the Thomas
corpus (Lieven, Salomo, & Tomasello, 2009, see section 6.3). The model’s input did not
contain yes-no questions with a center-embedded relative clause and an auxiliary in both
clauses as these structures are extremely rare in child-directed speech (Legate & Yang, 2002;
MacWhinney, 2004; Lieven et al., 2009). Complex sentences with auxiliaries in each clause
were either assertions or questions with a right-branching relative clause. Across speech
acts, subject-relatives were more frequent (58%) than object-relative clauses (42%). Present
and past tense were equally frequent in the input. Around 29% of all auxiliaries were modal
auxiliaries (can, could), 71% were non-modal (is, was, does, did), and this ratio was similar in
the Thomas corpus for the same auxiliaries (27% modal).
The input grammar generated approximately 5.7◊109 distinct message-sentence pairs
from which 50,000 items were randomly selected for training. Hence, the training set
represented less than 0.001% of the utterances licensed by the grammar. The model was
trained on these items ten times in succession for a total of 500,000 episodes. Because
di￿erent children hear di￿erent input during language development, 25 model subjects were
created and each subject was exposed to a di￿erent randomly generated training set. Test
sets contained 400 randomly generated message-sentence pairs composed of single-clause
declaratives, single-clause yes-no questions, complex right-branching and center-embedded
declaratives, and right-branching yes-no questions (50 items each). In addition, there were
150 complex center-embedded questions in the test set, 50 with two modal auxiliaries, 50
with two non-modal auxiliaries and 50 items with one modal and one non-modal auxiliary
(in any order). Questions of this kind had not occurred in the learning environment. The
model was tested on these items periodically after every 20,000 training episodes (= 1
epoch). Generalization to novel complex yes-no questions shown in Figure 3 represents the
mean performance over 25 model subjects, tested on 150 questions each.
A.5 Error coding
Production errors in complex questions were automatically extracted from the model’s
P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿W￿￿￿ output. They were coded as embedded auxiliary errors, auxiliary doubling,
or structure dependence errors in the following way. An embedded auxiliary error occurred
if questions started with an auxiliary, had a relative pronoun and the embedded verb in the
target positions, but the auxiliary preceding the embedded verb was omitted (e.g., Is [...] that
_ running [...]). Errors of structure dependence were only examined in questions where main
and embedded clause auxiliaries di￿ered, otherwise it would not be possible to determine
whether the sentence-initial auxiliary belonged to the main or embedded clause. For a
structure-dependent error to occur, the embedded clause auxiliary had to be produced
sentence-initially, it had to be omitted within the embedded clause, and the main clause
auxiliary had to occur in its canonical location (e.g., Can [...] that _ jump is [...] when the
target question was Is the boy that can jump lazy?). An auxiliary doubling error occurred
when questions started with an auxiliary, had a relative pronoun and the target embedded
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verb phrase in the correct position, and the main clause auxiliary was repeated following the
relative clause (e.g., Is [...] that was run -ing is [...]). Only if the produced utterance matched
the target question word-by-word it was labelled as a correct polar question.
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